University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2012

Notice-and-Comment Sentencing
Stephanos Bibas
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Richard A. Bierschbach
Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Criminology Commons,
Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Society Commons,
Philosophy Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Public Policy Commons

Repository Citation
Bibas, Stephanos and Bierschbach, Richard A., "Notice-and-Comment Sentencing" (2012). Faculty
Scholarship at Penn Law. 916.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/916

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Article

Notice-and-Comment Sentencing
†

Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas

††

Introduction ................................................................................... 2
I. Plea-Bargained Sentencing: Private Deals vs. The
Public Interest ......................................................................... 8
A. The Status Quo: Private Deals ........................................ 8
B. Missing: The Public Interest .......................................... 13
C. An Illustration ................................................................ 17
II. Participation and the Public Interest in Administrative
Law ......................................................................................... 20
A. Why Participation Matters ............................................ 20
B. How Participation Works ............................................... 25
1. Mechanisms of Participation ................................... 25
2. Participation, Explanation, and Judicial Review ... 29
C. Criminal Law’s Insularity .............................................. 31
III. Crafting a System of Notice-and-Comment Sentencing ..... 34
A. Wholesale or Retail? ....................................................... 35
B. At the Wholesale Level: Arrests, Charging, Plea
Bargaining, Guidelines, and Sentencing ...................... 37
C. At the Retail Level .......................................................... 47
† Associate Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University.
†† Professor of Law and Criminology and Director, Supreme Court Clinic, University of Pennsylvania Law School. We thank Mike Burstein, Vincent
Chiao, Michelle Dempsey, Michael Herz, Dan Markel, Max Minzner, Anthony
O’Rourke, Ronald Wright, and participants in faculty workshops at the University of Pennsylvania, Santa Clara University, and Loyola-Los Angeles Law
Schools, the Cardozo Junior Faculty Workshop, and the New York City Criminal Law Theory Colloquium at NYU for their valuable feedback, and Nick
LaSpina for excellent research assistance. Copyright © 2012 by Richard A.
Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas. [Editor’s Note: For further discussion of Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, see Erik Luna, Notice and Comment in Extremis, 97 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Ronald F. Wright, It’s the Reply,
Not the Comment: Observations About the Bierschbach and Bibas Proposal, 97
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas,
Marrying Participation and Expertise: A Reply to Professors Wright and Luna,
97 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).]

1

2

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:1

1. Who and How: Advance Notice ............................... 48
2. What: The Range of Facts, Factors, and Views ..... 49
3. To Whom: The Identity and Job of the
Sentencer .................................................................. 55
D. An Example: The Problem of Cooperation .................... 59
IV. Objections .............................................................................. 62
Conclusion .................................................................................... 68
INTRODUCTION
In theory, criminal sentencing is a matter of justice, a
question of public policy. Legislators, sentencing commissions,
police, prosecutors, and judges are supposed to weigh an array
of public values. In a democracy, voters naturally expect public
servants to serve the public’s shared sense of justice. That
sense reflects popular intuitions about retribution and expressive condemnation tempered in some cases by the need to deter,
1
incapacitate, reform, ensure fairness, and conserve resources.
That does not mean sentencing by opinion poll or mob rule; of
course prosecutors and judges should use their expertise and
try to filter out bias, vengefulness, and momentary passion. It
means giving the public a view and a voice, but not a veto.
Even though criminal justice experts should retain the upper
hand, they should at least consider a range of facts, factors, and
views. Public input not only informs the process, but also
makes the system democratically legitimate.
In practice, however, sentencing today looks very different
from this ideal. For one thing, most judges’ sentences are largely dictated by prosecutors’ plea bargains, which in turn reflect
charging decisions and enforcement and arrest policies. That is
doubly true in structured-sentencing jurisdictions, where sentencing guidelines adopted by unelected commissions add yet
another layer of constraint. Thus, sentencing judges often resemble figureheads, rubber-stamping faits accomplis rather
1. See Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and
Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
284, 288–97 (2002) (finding in empirical study that ordinary people assigned
punishments based on the seriousness of the crime and the existence of mitigating factors, but paid little attention to the chance of detection or the
amount of publicity); John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as
Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 660–71, 676 (2000)
(finding in empirical study that ordinary people assigned punishments based
on the wrongfulness of and moral outrage at the crime, but weighed the danger of future crime only in limited circumstances).

2012]

NOTICE-AND-COMMENT SENTENCING

3

than speaking in terms of deserved punishment or the broader
aims of sentencing.
A corollary is that dispositions are dictated by lawyers with
little if any lay input or information. At sentencing, victims, defendants, and community members may perhaps testify or
submit letters describing the offenses and harms suffered. But
that input comes far too late to receive meaningful consideration because lawyers and other experts have already decided
most factors determining sentence length before judges hear it.
Criminal justice professionals, especially prosecutors, largely
set sentences out of the public eye.
Relying heavily on plea-bargained sentences makes sense
only on the assumption that prosecutors, judges, police, and
sentencing commissions fully stand in for the public in doing
justice. That is in essence what the law of plea bargaining assumes. Today, the American criminal justice system treats a
plea bargain, including the sentence that it largely dictates,
primarily as a private bargain between the prosecutor and the
individual defendant. For decades, the Supreme Court has upheld large sentence discounts and bargaining threats of far
higher punishments by pointing to the “mutuality of advantage” that prosecutors and defendants reap by compromis2
ing. Leading scholars, most notably Judge Frank Easterbrook,
endorse this view of “[p]lea [b]argaining as [c]ompromise” because just as “[s]ettlements of civil cases make both sides better
3
off[,] settlements of criminal cases do so too.” Prosecutors (as
well as police and judges) lighten their workloads and conserve
time and resources for pursuing more cases, while defendants
get lower sentences. And both sides purchase certainty of sen4
tences, minimizing risk. Viewed narrowly as a bilateral private contract, a plea-bargained sentence leaves both prosecutor
and defendant better off.
There is only one thing missing from this rosy mutuality of
advantage: justice. Sentencing should not be about haggling
over the market price of a sack of potatoes, but about doing justice. In a democracy, justice must heed public values and voices. That is especially true of sentencing policy, which should
balance an eclectic assortment of facts, factors, and competing
2. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); accord
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
3. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J.
1969, 1969, 1975 (1992).
4. See id.
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conceptions of the public good. The interests and views at stake
are not limited to those of two partisans who bring their deal to
the sentencing judge as a fait accompli. Those partisans may
selectively present information and pursue private agendas
that may diverge from those of the public at large. As prosecutors are imperfect agents of the public interest, we cannot com5
placently trust plea bargaining to do justice.
When regulating plea bargaining, courts look by analogy to
private law, specifically contracts. But in modern criminal justice, with vastly overbroad criminal codes that offer prosecutors
extensive menus of options, plea bargaining is the making of
sentencing policy. In practice, it is prosecutors, not legislatures
or judges, who resolve many of the complex debates about justice in sentencing. But they make those value-laden decisions
out of sight, with little public input into or oversight of the
tradeoffs involved. This gap between prosecutors, as agents,
and the public, as the nominal principal whom they serve,
leaves prosecutors free to pursue their own self-interests, endangering the legitimacy of criminal justice and undercutting
public confidence and respect. To solve these problems, we need
to do more to ensure transparent and participatory processes
for real-world, prosecutor-driven sentencing. That would give
the public a voice, enhance legitimacy and oversight, and better
balance the public’s eclectic demands in the scales of justice.
Sentencing procedures should be open, fair, and accountable,
not just fast and cheap.
Public law, particularly administrative law, offers better
models for soliciting an array of information and viewpoints
that bear on the public interest in sentencing. Although calls
for reforming plea bargaining are decades old, only a few scholars have approached the issue from an administrative law perspective. Those who have done so have generally focused on the
institutional design of prosecutors’ offices or more robust enforcement of separation of powers and other structural consti6
tutional norms. The vast majority of plea-bargaining critiques
5. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2470–75 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009)
[hereinafter Barkow, Institutional Design]; Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2006) [hereinafter
Barkow, Separation of Powers]; Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System
of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1010 (2005); Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Screen-
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center on concerns that are internal to criminal justice, such as
leniency, disparity, unjust outcomes, and defendants’ individual rights.
These concerns are important, and they partly drive our
argument as well. But our public-law critique goes deeper, to
the legitimacy and soundness of policymaking by plea with few
meaningful opportunities for public input. We approach the
problem from the angle of citizen input into sentencing itself.
Modern administrative law views public participation as critical to limit agency discretion and ensure that agencies reflect
and protect the public interest. It is thus worth exploring how
administrative law might suggest reforms to make sentencing a
more participatory and inclusive process. We might consider,
then, notice-and-comment sentencing, by analogy to notice-andcomment rulemaking. That framework could apply to a range
of actors and decisions that influence sentencing, not only judges’ imposition of sentences, but also prosecutors’ decisions to
charge and plea bargain, sentencing commissions’ guidelines,
and possibly police decisions to arrest. Much of this input
would operate at the wholesale level (the level of formulating
overarching policies). Some of it could even be tried at the retail
level (the level of deciding individual cases), particularly in the
most significant cases that merit the greatest public concern.
Of course, the administrative law analogy is far from exact.
Sentencing is a far more common event than administrative
rulemaking and must necessarily move more swiftly. Prosecutors prosecute and judges decide individual cases, while most
agencies (except the NLRB) make rules of general applicability.
But, particularly for more important crimes, sentences often
reverberate beyond an individual case. Substantive policies
both emerge from and drive patterns of individual arrests,
charges, plea bargains, and sentences. Yet these patterns and
policies may be hidden and substantively questionable. Even
wholesale policies that are eventually made public suffer from
too little public involvement in their formulation. Sentencing
ing/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002) [hereinafter Wright &
Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff]; Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller,
The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1587 (2010) [hereinafter Wright & Miller, Accountability Deficit]; see also
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 188–207, 220–32 (1969) (suggesting ways to limit and structure prosecutorial discretion and to subject it to
judicial review); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981) (examining the nature and scope of prosecutorial
discretion and proposing reforms for channeling discretion and enhancing accountability).
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guidelines, for instance, sometimes emerge from hidden deliberations of unrepresentative sentencing commissions that neither provide public notice nor solicit public comment. In particular, the Federal Guidelines never went through the noticeand-comment process and have long been criticized as complex,
unintelligible, and unjust. The same insularity and opacity infects the prosecutorial decision-making that leads up to sentencing. At both the wholesale and retail levels, there is little
public input, little meaningful reason-giving to justify sentences, and only limited appellate review.
Despite their dissimilarities, administrative law may have
much to teach sentencing, including the arrest, charging, and
plea-bargaining processes that cash out at sentencing. A more
transparent, participatory process could create a feedback loop.
Trends in retail decisions could improve wholesale and retail
sentencing policy incrementally over time and flesh out in practice the meaning of fuzzy abstractions such as retribution. The
right sentencing procedures could better blend expert and lay
perspectives to offer competing views their day in court and illuminate prosecutors’ and judges’ sentencing decisions. And
better sentencing procedures could promote statements of reasons, appellate review, and consistency across cases. These reforms could improve post-trial sentencing as well. But they are
especially needed in the many cases that would otherwise be
resolved unilaterally by a prosecutor’s charging and pleabargaining decisions.
Public participation could improve sentencing and its antecedent processes in three distinct ways. First, it can illuminate
the values at stake, shedding light on the composite public interest. Information about values matters most in setting wholesale policies, but it might also matter interstitially at the retail
level, in applying policies to atypical cases within a defined
sentencing range. Second, public input can also bring important facts and data to light, subject to fact-finding procedures and safeguards. And third, both wholesale and retail participation carry expressive benefits, empowering citizens to air
their views and take part in public policy debate.
The remainder of this Article unfolds in four parts. Part I
critiques the dominant treatment of the process leading up to
sentencing, particularly plea bargaining, as mostly a bilateral
private deal and explains the sentencing deficiencies that flow
from that approach. Prosecutors need not explain or even have
any charging policies, which allows charges to vary by prosecu-
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tor and by the desire to stack up plea-bargaining chips. In plea
bargaining, prosecutors are free to threaten artificially high
sentences or compromise on unduly low ones through a hidden
process with little real oversight. The resulting charges and
plea bargains largely dictate sentences. Judges usually rubberstamp these deals for a variety of reasons: sentencing laws and
unelected sentencing commissions often tie judges’ hands;
judges have little information beyond what the parties supply;
and no one else offers contrary views, or those views arrive too
late to matter. Judges may give sparse reasons for their sentences, and those reasons are often subject to little appellate
review, particularly because neither party will complain. The
process largely shuts out information and perspectives provided
by the public, victims, and other defendants.
Part II explains how administrative law has long sought to
address similar concerns. Often, broad governing statutes offer
little substantive guidance, leaving agencies free to make
countless value-laden choices in the name of the public interest.
Early on, administrative law recognized the need to leaven
agency policymaking with meaningful public input, backed up
by explanations and judicial review. A variety of laws, including the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment
7
provisions, cabin agency discretion and foster legitimacy, accountability, and substantively good outcomes by opening
agency processes to public participation. While criminal sentencing suffers from the same underlying structural and institutional concerns, criminal justice has not kept pace. A prime
example is the U.S. Sentencing Commission: the opacity and
insularity of its process is partly to blame for the failings of its
much-hated Guidelines.
Part III considers how one could translate these administrative law principles into criminal cases to create something
like notice-and-comment sentencing. At the wholesale level,
public input would inform the drafting of policies on arrest,
charging, and plea bargaining, as well as sentencing guidelines.
At the retail level, judges would first have to give notice of proposed sentences before accepting plea bargains, at least in the
most visible, most serious cases. The notice could solicit a range
of public input on everything from the harm to the victim and
community, to the wrongfulness of the act and the blameworthiness of the actor, to the need for deterrence, to the interests
of third parties and society at large. The sentence would need
7. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
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to take significant comments into account, include a reasoned
decision responding to them, and be subject to appellate review
that probes the sentencer’s reasoning. We envision a ladder of
possible retail input, depending on one’s willingness to heed citizens, victims, and community members. Public participation
could be limited to providing factual information about the
crime, the defendant, and the harms suffered. It could also illuminate the relevant sentencing factors. Or it might even extend to offering views and suggested outcomes, at least within
ranges established by wholesale policies. Sentencing procedures would let the parties contradict or respond to public
comments before judges made retail findings. Because prosecutors and defense counsel would not appeal their own bargains,
one might also need to allow sua sponte appellate review or appeals by probation officers or other stakeholders.
Part IV responds to likely objections, including concerns
about participation by a representative sample of the public,
negative effects on law enforcement, and the cost and volume of
cases. These are real concerns, but they are not insurmountable. This Article concludes that the right administrative procedures and structures could blend popular input and expertise,
checking agency costs and making sentencing more democratically legitimate, inclusive, and fair.
I. PLEA-BARGAINED SENTENCING: PRIVATE DEALS VS.
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
This Article’s overarching concern is with criminal sentencing. But today, the idea of a single, unitary moment of sentencing is by and large a myth. Real-world sentencing—what really
determines sentences—has multiple stages. One of the most
critical is plea bargaining. We start there, because it epitomizes
the system’s insularity and opacity.
A. THE STATUS QUO: PRIVATE DEALS
The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed plea bargaining as an efficient way to save time and money and further the
parties’ preferences. As the Court recognized in Brady v. United States, plea bargains benefit both sides: defendants cap their
sentencing exposure and get their cases over with, while prose8
cutors conserve resources to pursue other cases. Though the
Court hinted that defendants who plead guilty are more ame8. 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
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nable to rehabilitation and more quickly incapacitated, it fo9
cused on the “mutuality of advantage” accruing to both sides.
The Court believed the parties “arguably possess relatively
equal bargaining power” and arrive at mutually beneficial
10
deals through “give-and-take negotiation.” Competently advised defendants “are presumptively capable of intelligent
11
choice.” Plea bargaining is “essential,” the Court has held, because otherwise the judiciary would need many more judges
12
and courtrooms to handle prosecutors’ crushing workloads.
Thus, prosecutors may not only offer lower sentences, but also
13
threaten heavier ones, in order to induce guilty pleas.
The Court’s bargain model is consistent with its general
deference to the parties’ preferences, even in criminal cases.
The Court strongly presumes that most rules of evidence and
criminal procedure can be waived as long as the waiver is
knowing and voluntary and Congress has not expressly forbid14
den it. That is true even of the constitutional rights to jury
trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which defendants
15
waive every day in pleading guilty. A defendant may even
16
plead guilty while simultaneously protesting his innocence.
Consistent with the Court’s focus on party autonomy, the
main limitations on plea bargaining are analogous to the requirements for a valid contract. A plea must be knowing and
17
voluntary. There are a few more safeguards than in contract
law, including the right to counsel and the requirements of an
18
adequate factual basis and a litany of waivers on the record.
But the main rule of law is that prosecutors must live up to
their bargains. As in contract law, “when a plea rests in any
9. Id. at 752–53; see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260–61
(1971).
10. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (quoting Parker v.
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, J.)).
11. Id. at 363.
12. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
13. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363–65; Brady, 397 U.S. at 750–54.
14. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200–02 (1995).
15. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (enumerating the rights waived during a
federal guilty-plea colloquy).
16. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970).
17. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242
(1969).
18. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b); see also Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 (emphasizing the presence of a “strong factual basis for the plea” when accepting defendant’s guilty plea despite his simultaneous protestation of innocence);
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242–43 (holding that waiver of rights cannot be presumed
from a silent record).
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significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor,
so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or considera19
tion, such promise must be fulfilled.” Thus, when enforcing
plea bargains, courts borrow such contract-law doctrines as
detrimental reliance and the rule of construing contracts contra
20
proferentem. The main practical safeguard is that prosecutors
and many defense counsel are repeat players who know the going rates and have reputational stakes in living up to their
21
word.
The federal and a majority of state systems forbid judges to
participate in plea discussions, leaving bargained-for sentences
22
up to the two parties. Of course, judges remain free to reject
plea agreements or to vary from the recommended sentence,
23
except under stipulated-sentence plea agreements. But the
plea-bargaining system presupposes that judges usually will
accept bargains and hew close to the parties’ recommended sentences. Presented with a fait accompli, and unfamiliar with the
facts because there has been no trial, most judges do just that,
24
rubber-stamping the bargain and sentence. A bit more information may emerge at sentencing, when victims may submit
victim-impact statements and probation officers offer presentence investigation reports. By then, however, the judge usually
has accepted the plea bargain and so can do little to incorporate
new information or perspectives. At most, the judge may con19. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
20. Contra proferentem is the canon of construing ambiguities in contracts
against the drafter. See, e.g., United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 552 (3d
Cir. 2002) (summarizing cases applying contra proferentem canon to plea
agreements); People v. Navarroli, 521 N.E.2d 891, 893–95 (Ill. 1998) (detrimental reliance); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (allowing
parties to specify remedy for breach that operated in effect as waiver of double-jeopardy right); Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509–10 (1984) (treating
plea agreement as binding only when defendant pleads guilty in reliance on
prosecutorial promise that the prosecution later breaches), abrogated on other
grounds by Puckett v. United States 556 U.S. 129 (2009); Santobello, 404 U.S.
at 262 (granting relief where defendant pleaded guilty in reliance on prosecutorial promise and prosecutor later breached that promise, albeit inadvertently).
21. See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 30
(2012); Bibas, supra note 5, at 2480–81.
22. See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES:
PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION 390 (2d ed. 2005); see also FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(c)(1).
23. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1), (3).
24. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY
OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 131–34 (2003).
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sider these factors in exercising discretion within the sentencing range left open by the bargain.
The prosecutor’s charging decisions control that range to
begin with. Judges can sentence defendants only for crimes to
which they plead, and defendants can plead only to crimes with
which they are charged. Charge bargains let prosecutors hem
in judges’ freedom to deviate at sentencing by choosing from an
extensive menu of charges and sentencing ranges provided by
25
today’s modern criminal codes. In structured-sentencing jurisdictions, sentencing guidelines bolster that power, further
constraining judges and allowing prosecutors to promise specif26
ic sentences more credibly. Charges thus become contract offers, setting the terms of the bargain and nailing down the
price of performance at sentencing. Prosecutors vary the offers
by varying the charges. Judges, operating within a long tradition of strong deference to prosecutors, are reluctant to inter27
vene.
Plea bargains, like private bargains, require almost no
public justification. A prosecutor need not explain a plea bargain at all, and a judge need do little to justify an agreed-upon
sentence. In the minority of jurisdictions with sentencing
guidelines, the judge may have to compute the offense level and
recommended range and fill out a simple form. But, especially
for a sentence within the recommended range, the judge need
28
say little about his reasons for selecting a specific sentence.
Thus, there is little justification or record to permit meaningful
appellate review. Indeed, when the judge sentences in accordance with the parties’ bargain, there probably will be no appellate review at all because neither side will appeal. Even if the
parties are occasionally unhappy with the sentences on which
they have agreed, plea bargains typically waive the right to ap25. See, e.g., David A. Starkweather, The Retributive Theory of “Just Deserts” and Victim Participation in Plea Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853, 872
(1992).
26. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics
in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1304 (1997); Jeffrey
Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV.
1471, 1505–17 (1993).
27. See Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 6, at 871–72.
28. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 356–59 (2007) (allowing courts to presume within-Guidelines sentences reasonable, requiring
less explanation for within-Guidelines sentences (particularly when the defendant and prosecutor do not argue for a different sentence), and affirming a
brief statement of reasons).
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peal sentences, at least within the agreed-upon range. Victims
and the public are not parties to criminal cases and cannot ap30
peal sentences.
Academic defenders of plea bargaining, most notably Judge
Frank Easterbrook, embrace the market analogy to contracts
for particular sentences, including the charge bargaining that
comes with it. Easterbrook candidly acknowledges that the contract analogy fits awkwardly. The two sides are bilateral monopolists, and they bargain in the shadow of sentencing guidelines that operate as price controls, over a deal that makes one
31
side worse off. Nevertheless, plea bargains make sense, he argues. “[C]ompromise is better than conflict” because it allows
defendants to cap their exposure and get their cases over with,
while letting prosecutors leverage their resources to convict
32
many more defendants and maximize deterrence. The revealed preferences of defendants and prosecutors confirm that
33
it must leave both sides better off.
Another group of plea-bargaining proponents who are less
enamored of the free market embrace the contract metaphor
even as they seek to regulate it. Robert Scott and the late Bill
Stuntz, for example, acknowledge “fundamental structural impediments” that warp plea bargaining, but propose to mend it,
34
not end it. They nevertheless insist that “classical contract
theory supports the freedom to bargain over criminal punish35
ment.” While perhaps defendants and the government should
not be free to barter punishment, Scott and Stuntz believe that
view would collide with “[t]he entire structure of the criminal
29. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 231, 243–44 (2005) (finding, in an
empirical study of nearly one thousand defendants, that defendants waived
their rights to appeal in nearly two-thirds of all plea-bargained cases and that
most of those waivers applied to appealing sentences as well as convictions).
30. See DOUGLAS E. BELOOF ET AL., VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
760–61, 764 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that victims may appeal only if expressly
authorized to do so by statute and that only Maryland and Utah authorize appeals of denials of victims’ procedural rights, although several other states
permit discretionary review of victims’-rights claims via the extraordinary
writ of mandamus).
31. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 1975.
32. Id.
33. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12
J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309 (1983).
34. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1910–11 (1992).
35. Id. at 1910.
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justice system” in America. The private law of contracts is
woven into the fabric of our law; a fundamentally public-law
model is too radical for Scott and Stuntz to contemplate.
B. MISSING: THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The loose thread that unravels Easterbrook’s account is his
identification of prosecutors with the public interest: “If defendants and prosecutors (representing society) both gain, the
37
process is desirable.” While prosecutors and defense lawyers
suffer from agency costs, he dismisses that objection as “trivial”
38
because “[a]gency costs are endemic” throughout life. Easterbrook’s casual equation of prosecutors with all of society’s multifarious interests is far too quick. It reduces justice to convictions and reduces the criminal justice morality play to a hidden
bargain.
Because prosecutorial discretion is standardless and
opaque, prosecutors have great leeway to exploit the gap between their own interests and those of the public, and they frequently do. Prosecutors may often view their job as maximizing
convictions, but that is far from society’s only interest. Prosecutors have self-interests in lightening their workloads and avoiding embarrassing acquittals, so they are likely to be too riskaverse about taking cases to trial and thus too pliable on sen39
tences. They may offer deeper discounts to aggressive or wellconnected defense counsel, especially in cases involving corpo40
rate or white-collar crime. That pliability undermines racial
and economic equality and can harm the diffuse public interest
36. Id. at 1917.
37. Easterbrook, supra note 33, at 309. The public interest, we note, is a
famously slippery concept, and we do not offer or defend a full normative account of that concept here. Our claim is more modest: however one defines the
public interest, one must seek to accommodate, balance, and reflect the public’s disparate and often conflicting values. Criminal justice, as currently administered, has drifted too far from that ideal.
38. Id. at 309; Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 1975.
39. See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2470–72.
40. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1729, 1745 (1993) (“The credible threat of an aggressive defense that will not
necessarily lead to acquittal . . . may provide a bargaining chip sufficient to
persuade an otherwise recalcitrant prosecutor to bargain in good faith.”); see
also Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of
Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1330–31 (2001) (observing that
“white-collar criminals are harder for the government to pursue because they
can raise enforcement costs with vigorous legal defenses starting early in investigations”).
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in vigorous enforcement.
Prosecutors might also overregulate, quickly pleading out high volumes of low-level crimes
while glossing over real questions of guilt or the serious collat42
eral consequences that might flow from such low-level pleas.
They are trained to put cases into legal and administrative pigeonholes, shutting out laymen’s broader concerns about equity
43
and morality. In Josh Bowers’s evocative phrase, they “learn
to think inside the proverbial legal box” without reflecting on
how to exercise their discretion in line with the public’s sense of
44
justice. They grow jaded by legal training and force of habit,
45
so they come to lack outsiders’ fresh perspectives.
Moreover, prosecutors appear to share Easterbrook’s fundamentally bottom-line approach. They behave as if their job is
to maximize convictions and thus deterrence and incapacitation. That view tends to slight less quantifiable substantive
goals such as rehabilitation, retribution, and expressive condemnation, as well as softer values like reconciliation and forgiveness. The rhetoric of justice, not just efficiency, matters.
The bottom-line mentality also slights the process benefits of
46
transparent, participatory procedures. Victims, defendants,
and community members want their day in court. They want to
know that the prosecutor has their best interests at heart. They
want to see justice done, and they may want a voice in doing it.
The mix of public values that goes into plea bargaining is complex, and we cannot necessarily trust prosecutors to get it right
on their own.
Historically, criminal justice was both transparent and
participatory. Until about two centuries ago, lay litigants and
juries took the lead in matters of crime and punishment, hearing and deciding cases, assigning blame, and imposing sentenc47
es at public trials. Even after professional prosecutors displaced pro se victims, prosecutors and judges lived in or near
the neighborhoods they governed and were responsive to local
communities’ needs, views, and senses of justice. That collective
historical memory, embedded in the Bill of Rights’ jury-trial
41. See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2477–86.
42. See BIBAS, supra note 21, at 30, 32–33, 48–49.
43. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1689–92 (2010).
44. Id. at 1690.
45. BIBAS, supra note 21, at 32–33, 39–40.
46. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 922–23, 930–31 (2006).
47. See BIBAS, supra note 21, at 1–9.
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guarantees, still informs the public’s expectations and desire to
see justice done. But these virtues are all but absent from today’s sentencing hearings that rubber-stamp plea-bargained
sentences. Plea bargaining occurs much earlier and out of
sight. It excludes victims, community members, and other third
parties from meaningful roles in illuminating the public inter48
ests at stake in sentencing.
Partisan control also threatens the structural safeguards
on criminal justice. An independent judiciary is supposed to
pursue justice, ensure public confidence, and promote the development of the law through precedent. It is supposed to check
partisan prosecutors, who may be overzealous and overreach or
serve their self-interests. To that end, witnesses and victims
should offer their information and views, and probation officers
should (and do) write up presentence investigation reports to
inform sentencing judges. Sentencing judges are then supposed
to offer reasons, and appellate courts can review those decisions
and issue reasoned opinions that seek to ensure fair and consistent sentencing policy across cases.
The collusion endemic to plea bargaining subverts these
structural safeguards, tying judges’ hands at sentencing. It
risks letting prosecutors, unchecked by judges, vary sentence
discounts for possibly arbitrary or discriminatory reasons. Defendants themselves provide almost no pushback, as they
overwhelmingly prefer to avoid trial and more severe post-trial
sentences. Defendants’ individual rights thus do little to check
prosecutors, even when the exercise of those rights would clear49
ly serve the public interest. In addition, witnesses and victims
who never testify cannot explain the harms defendants have
caused or the punishments they might merit, and defendants’
families or affected communities cannot explain how the sentencing policies at issue affect their own interests. When explanations do come, they often arrive only after bargains have settled matters. Parties sometimes limit or manipulate the
sentencing information available, and judges often ignore
presentence reports when they conflict with the parties’ bar50
gains. Parties choose not to appeal and may waive their rights
to do so. As a result, appellate review has little power to pre48. See id. at 1–6, 18–20, 29–40, 52.
49. See Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 6, at 1033–34.
50. See Francesca D. Bowman, Prob. Officers Advisory Grp. to the U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n, Probation Officers Advisory Group Survey, 8 FED. SENT’G
REP. 303, 305–06 (1996).
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vent inequality, protect victims, or develop sentencing prece51
dents in typical cases. And it does little to assure that pleabargained sentencing adequately reflects and furthers public
values.
The opacity and insularity of prosecutorial policies exacerbate the problem. Bargained-for sentences often reverberate
beyond the individual case, with substantive policies both
emerging from and driving individual charging, bargaining,
52
and sentencing. Yet these policies may often be hidden and
substantively questionable. Some prosecutors’ offices have
barebones charging and bargaining guidelines, if they have any
53
at all. Others have more extensive but still informal policies,
developed incrementally through office meetings, memoranda,
54
and “a general process of osmosis.” Even those offices that
have fairly detailed written guidelines rarely make them public. And even those guidelines that are public are usually for55
mulated behind closed doors without public input.
Lacking both wholesale- and retail-level input, the public
has little way to probe plea bargaining’s value choices or to
51. See Stephanos Bibas et al., Policing Politics at Sentencing, 103 NW. U.
L. REV. 1371, 1394 –95 (2009) (discussing how broad appeal waivers license
collusion and threaten the development of precedent).
52. For a particularly salient example of non-party effects of retail sentences, consider what some observers have dubbed a possible “Madoff effect”
on recent white-collar sentences, involving a noticeable uptick in sentences of
record-breaking severity since Bernard Madoff received a prison sentence of
150 years after pleading guilty to arguably the largest individual financial
crime in U.S. history. See Amir Efrati, Possible Madoff Effect: Triple-Digit
White-Collar Prison Sentences, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 19, 2010, 2:20 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/02/19/possible-madoff-effect-triple-digit-whitecollar-prison-sentences/ (describing three record-breaking white-collar sentences handed down in the months following Madoff ’s sentencing and noting
belief among many legal scholars that the Madoff sentence “likely empowered
other judges to impose enormous, symbolic sentences for fraudsters”).
53. See, e.g., Thomas Michael McDonnell, Playing Beyond the Rules: A
Realist and Rhetoric-Based Approach to Researching the Law and Solving Legal Problems, 67 UMKC L. REV. 285, 301 n.86 (1998); Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 442
(1971); Dominick R. Vetri, Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by
Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 900 (1964) (finding
that forty-seven out of sixty-seven prosecutors questioned worked in offices
without formal rules or procedures with respect to plea bargaining).
54. White, supra note 53, at 442.
55. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power,
and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 443 (2001) (“Unless the prosecutor alerts her constituents to policies and invites input, the public may remain uninformed. Prosecutors rarely publicize information on charging and
plea bargaining policies on the ground that such openness would threaten law
enforcement.”); McDonnell, supra note 53, at 301 n.86.
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check their prosecutorial agents. They cannot question whether
a lenient sentence for a first-time thief reflects a line prosecutor’s personal mercy or an officewide policy of flushing petit larceny cases to rack up quick conviction statistics. They cannot
know whether a stiff penalty for a juvenile mugger flows from a
prosecutor’s own vindictiveness or a blanket refusal to charge
bargain over violent crimes. And they cannot weigh in on the
written and unwritten rules that drive plea bargaining. Those
rules stretch from the moment of arrest, through charging
thresholds, to diversion standards, to sentencing enhancements, to prosecutorial resource allocation across cases. Prosecutors are free to craft those policies as they see fit, privileging
their own interests and concerns over those of the public they
supposedly serve.
C. AN ILLUSTRATION
The problems inherent in bargained-for sentences became
apparent most recently in one of the rare cases to reject a bargain. In October 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued Citigroup civilly for securities fraud, accusing
it of misleading investors into investing in weak assets that
56
Citigroup proceeded to bet against. On the same day that it
filed its complaint, the SEC proposed and Citigroup consented
to a civil settlement of the charges. Under the settlement,
Citigroup would disgorge its profits on the deal plus interest,
pay a $95 million penalty, agree to a permanent injunction, and
adopt internal safeguards against securities fraud. As part of
the settlement, Citigroup would neither admit nor deny the al57
legations. The SEC has long entered into such consent decrees
without requiring any admission or denial of wrongdoing. That
“long-standing policy [is] hallowed by history,” as judges usual58
ly go along with the SEC’s recommendations. Like many prosecutors, the SEC justifies its practice by noting that settlements allow the agency to pursue many more cases with its
59
limited resources.
56. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329–30
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
57. See id. at 330.
58. Id. at 332.
59. See, e.g., SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed
by the Court Regarding Proposed Settlement at 12–13, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011) (citing SEC v.
Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529–30 (9th Cir. 1984)).
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Judge Jed Rakoff rejected the settlement. His rejection was
so extraordinary that it made the front page of the New York
60
Times. Judge Rakoff noted that Citigroup was a recidivist,
61
having been accused of and settled similar claims before. Yet
the settlement would produce little deterrence or restitution
given Citigroup’s size and profitability and the $700 million lost
62
by investors. More importantly, the parties’ “narrow interests
[in settling] . . . cannot be automatically equated with the public interest, especially in the absence of a factual base on which
to assess whether the resolution was fair, adequate, and rea63
sonable.” While courts must defer to the SEC’s expertise, they
must independently satisfy themselves that settlements serve
64
the public interest. Unless a trial establishes facts or the parties admit them, judges lack a basis for evaluating settlements
65
and deploying coercive power. And while the public has an
“overriding public interest in knowing the truth,” settlements
without facts “deprive[] [the public] of ever knowing the truth
66
in a matter of obvious public importance.”
Granted, Citigroup is a civil-fraud case and involves hundreds of millions of dollars. But its concern for the judiciary’s
independent role in safeguarding the public good applies at
least as strongly to criminal cases. And the problem it illustrates is endemic to even the most mundane, low-level criminal
67
matters. Prosecuting agencies are imperfect guardians of the
public interest, so judges must check them. The parties’ private
interests in settling disputes do not exhaust the public’s interest in airing all the facts, seeing justice done, and testing bar60. See Edward Wyatt, Judge Rejects an S.E.C. Deal With Citigroup, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2011, at A1.
61. See Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333–34.
62. See id. at 329, 333–34.
63. Id. at 335.
64. See id. at 330–32.
65. See id. at 332, 335.
66. Id. at 332, 335.
67. To be sure, unlike in the administrative penalty context, in all criminal cases, even the most mundane ones, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and analogous state rules require a judge accepting a plea to
find that it has an adequate factual basis. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.4(f ) nn. 21–22 (5th ed.
2009) (discussing the factual basis requirement of Rule 11 and comparable
state rules). In practice, however, that requirement does little to ensure either
that the actual facts surrounding the crime are fully disclosed or that the
prosecutor’s charging decision takes full and fair account of those facts. See
infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.

2012]

NOTICE-AND-COMMENT SENTENCING

19

gaining policies that may be “hallowed by history, but not by
68
reason.”
69
Yet the ruling is exceptional, almost unprecedented. It is
the rare judge who will stick his neck out and thwart a settlement. Judges value settlements because they clear their dockets expeditiously, and when the parties agree there is no one to
complain, appeal, or offer a different point of view. For many
years, judges have routinely acceded to securities settlements
70
without requiring an admission of wrongdoing. Much the
same happens in criminal cases, where defendants may hedge,
take no position, or even openly deny guilt while reaping plea71
bargained sentences. Even when defendants grudgingly admit
guilt as part of plea bargains, the parties may present only selective and partial accounts rather than a full record of all the
facts and views. And even when judges, sentencing guidelines,
or statutes might call for a different sentence in light of a given
bad act, prosecutors can still determine the effective sentence
by deciding what crime to charge. The upshot, as Judge Gerard
Lynch, Rachel Barkow, and others have explained, is that prosecutors hold all the cards: they are the investigators, adjudicators, and sentencers rolled into one, with tremendous power to
72
shape sentencing policy in practice.
The problem of plea bargaining, then, is not just one of disparity, questionable convictions or acquittals, or unjust outcomes. These are real problems, but they are symptoms of a
structural flaw that leaves prosecutors and defendants free to
pursue their own interests outside of the public eye. The problem, in short, is one of hidden and unaccountable policymaking
by plea.

68. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
69. See Wyatt, supra note 60, at A1 (quoting former SEC chairman Harvey Pitt: “This is clearly a case of great significance . . . . It’s also a case for
which there is no direct precedent.”). The Second Circuit has stayed the proceedings before Judge Rakoff, finding “that the S.E.C. and Citigroup have
made a strong showing of likelihood of success in setting aside” Judge Rakoff ’s
rejection of the settlement. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc., 673 F.3d 158,
169 (2012). Given that the SEC and Citigroup are united in opposition to
Judge Rakoff ’s order, the court also appointed counsel to defend the order on
appeal. Id. at 161.
70. See Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
71. See BIBAS, supra note 21, at 60–62.
72. See Lynch, supra note 6 at 2120; see also Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 6 at 1025.
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II. PARTICIPATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative law has long grappled with similar issues.
Administrative agencies, like prosecutors, operate under massive statutory delegations of power. The agency personnel who
implement those statutory charges make thousands of valueladen decisions every day, from micro-level choices about
whether to issue drilling permits to macro-level judgments
about allowable levels of contaminants in drinking water. As in
criminal law, those decisions greatly affect regulated parties,
communities, and the general public.
But unlike criminal law, administrative law has been built
around ensuring that agencies make those decisions in the public interest. A central concept is participation, the idea that citizens should have some input into agency decisions. Public participation, of course, is not the only way to check agency abuses.
But it is a crucial way to ensure that agency decisions are legitimate, accountable, and just.
There are many ways to ensure participation, ranging from
the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirements to commonlaw principles that inform judicial review. They all seek to
leaven agency decision-making with a healthy dose of public
input, blending democracy with agency expertise and judicial
oversight. And while the same legitimacy and accountability
concerns that drive participation in administrative law also exist in criminal justice, criminal law has not kept pace.
A. WHY PARTICIPATION MATTERS
Before continuing, we should say more about what participation is and why it matters. Members of the public can participate in governmental decision-making in many ways. One can
vote for a president, a member of Congress, or one’s local prosecutor. Voting is abstract and general: it imperfectly communicates the voter’s preferences on any given policy and does not
involve the voter in the details of policymaking. At the other
end of the spectrum are more direct modes of participation, in
which citizens actually exercise governmental power. Examples
73
include serving on a citizen licensing board or a criminal jury.

73. See James D. Chesney, Citizen Participation on Regulatory Boards, 9
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 125, 125–35 (1984); Ronald F. Wright, Why Not
Administrative Grand Juries?, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 475–80 (1992).
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Both forms of participation are important, and we will re74
turn to each briefly later on. But the kind of participation we
envision is somewhere in between. It involves letting citizens
communicate their information and views, but leaves the governmental decision-maker ultimate power to balance the various inputs and make a final decision. In the process of reconciling these voices, the decision-maker mediates among various
conceptions of the public good. This sort of participation has become a cornerstone of modern administrative law. Indeed, as
Ronald Wright and Marc Miller put it, “the history of administrative government in the United States can be framed as a
75
story about combining expertise and public input.”
Why does participation of this sort matter to administrative law? It was not always this way. The Progressive reformers
who put into place the broad institutional outlines of the modern regulatory state aimed to insulate administrative agencies
from citizen involvement, not encourage it. At best, citizens
were seen as incompetent in the affairs of government; at
worst, they were suspect as corrupted instruments of majoritar76
ian politics. Professional agency personnel, by contrast, were
viewed as highly skilled technocrats who merely called upon
their professional training to implement judgments that al77
ready had been made by Congress. New Dealers like James
Landis took the notion further, famously maintaining that administration was a science in which experts “bred to the facts”
could ascertain and implement the objective public interest
with only the most casual guidance from their organic stat78
utes.
But as the federal government exploded in size and the authority delegated to agencies mushroomed, the place of participation in the administrative state quickly changed. It soon be74. See infra text accompanying notes 249–250, 287–293.
75. Wright & Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1591.
76. See Jasper Y. Brinton, Some Powers and Problems of the Federal Administrative, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 135, 160–61 (1913) (discussing need for special
training of administrative officials); Wright, supra note 73, at 495–96 (discussing Progressive concern that lay citizens could not serve competently or independently).
77. See BENJAMIN P. DE WITT, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 299–318
(1915); MARTIN J. SCHIESL, THE POLITICS OF EFFICIENCY: MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM IN AMERICA: 1880–1920, at 6–25 (1977); RUSSELL
STORY, THE AMERICAN MUNICIPAL EXECUTIVE 218–20 (1918); Morris L.
Cooke, Scientific Management of the Public Business, 9 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 488
(1915).
78. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154–55 (1938).
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came apparent that even the most expert agency personnel engaged in the most seemingly technical of inquiries could not
avoid making deeply discretionary, highly value-laden deci79
sions in the name of the public interest. One cannot, for instance, determine the limit on parts per million of airborne
benzene that is “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide
safe or healthful employment” without confronting difficult
tradeoffs of dollars versus lives or lives versus jobs; even “safety” is a fundamentally normative question that implicates una80
voidable value judgments. At the same time, scholars increasingly recognized that agencies were not the enlightened
Platonic guardians of the New Dealers’ vision. They were imperfectly attuned to the public interest, with their own preferences, agendas, incentives, and susceptibilities to capture by
the very industries they were supposed to regulate. In other
81
words, “the public interest is a texture of multiple strands”
82
and “not a monolith”; even if it were monolithic, we could not
necessarily trust agencies to pursue it. Those realizations undermined the notion of the impartial and just administrator
83
and opened up a troubling legitimacy gap in the field. The
project of administrative law quickly shifted from protecting
agencies from citizen interference to closing that gap and structuring agency discretion. Scholars now seek to “explain how
unelected bureaucrats, making their choices without resort to a
scientific method that produces a single correct answer, can
84
claim to exercise legitimate power in a democracy.”
79. See Richard B. Stewart, Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1676 (1975).
80. See Indust. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 615 (1980).
81. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 627 (1944) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
82. Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings,
81 YALE L.J. 359, 360 (1972).
83. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245, 2253–54 (2001) (tracing the rise of the regulatory state and the evolution
of concerns about objectivity and legitimacy that accompanied it); Stewart, supra note 79, at 1682–88 (discussing reduced faith in agencies’ ability to protect
collective interests and the resulting need for new approaches to legitimating
agency action and controlling agency discretion).
84. Wright, supra note 73, at 501 (citing CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 217 (1990)); see also William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law—Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L.
REV. 171, 172–80 (2009) (discussing the history and legal and political context
of the development of public participation as a cornerstone of modern American administrative law).
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Participation has become embedded in modern administrative law as critical to that project for several reasons. It enhances the soundness of agency decisions by improving the
quality and variety of the information an agency considers,
85
whether empirical or related to the public’s preferences. It
improves accountability by obligating agencies to justify their
actions publicly, ensuring that they are “relatively informed
86
and responsive to public needs.” It increases public trust and
educates citizens in government affairs, creating feedback loops
87
between agencies and citizens. And, by requiring agencies to
“balanc[e] all elements essential to a just determination of the
public interest,” it bolsters agency decision-making’s democrat88
ic pedigree.
Of course, how participation binds agents to the citizenry
and promotes legitimacy will vary depending on one’s theory of
89
how agencies work. Neo-pluralist theorists view agency decisions as legitimate because they let agencies aggregate the information and preferences of a wide variety of competing inter90
est groups. Civic republicans focus more on the intrinsically
democratic nature of agency decision-making itself, seeing it as
85. See Stewart, supra note 79, at 1748.
86. Misso Servs. Corp., v. Small Bus. Admin., No. 81-0283, 1981 WL
30841, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1981).
87. See HARRY C. BOYTE, COMMONWEALTH: A RETURN TO CITIZEN POLITICS 131–33, 147–56 (1989); MARY G. KWEIT & ROBERT W. KWEIT, IMPLEMENTING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY: A CONTINGENCY APPROACH, 35–36, 84–96 (1981); CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION
AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 22–44 (1970); John Ladd, The Ethics of Participation, in XVI NOMOS: PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS 98, 112–20 (J.R. Pennock &
John R. Chapman eds., 1975); Hannah F. Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private
and Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 343, 348 (1981).
88. Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 475 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); see also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400–01 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (“[T]he very legitimacy of general policymaking performed by unelected
adminsitrators depends in no small part on the openness, accessibility, and
amenability of these officials to the needs and ideas of the public.”); Palisades
Citizens Ass’n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 420 F.2d 188, 191–92 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
89. It also will vary to at least some degree depending on the specific context, as the possibility of a gap between principal and agent interests, and the
discounting of public values, will be more intense in some agency settings than
in others. For an effort to sort out the times when external monitoring and
public input will be most valuable as a supplement to agency expertise and
professionalism, see Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the
Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 577, 589–95 (2011).
90. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 57–60 (1998).

24

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:1
91

collective deliberation about competing regulatory values.
Public-interest theorists focus “on the general public’s ability to
92
monitor regulatory decisionmakers.” Principal-agent theories
take a different tack, seeking to locate agencies’ legitimacy in
93
their responsiveness to democratically elected actors. Publicchoice theorists eschew legitimating agency regulation altogether. Instead, they see it as suboptimal market decisionmaking, in which agencies deliver regulatory “goods” to wellorganized political interest groups, which profit at the expense
94
of the diffuse public.
The differences among these theories are significant, and
we do not mean to oversimplify. But our point is not to debate
them here. As Nina Mendelson explains, virtually all of the major theories that seek to legitimate administrative decision95
making see participation as important. Neo-pluralists might
see the opportunity to supply information and participate as
96
crucial to aggregating interests effectively. Civic republicans
might see it as necessary to ensure that agency deliberations
97
“thoroughly engage relevant viewpoints.” Even presidentialcontrol proponents might see direct public involvement as a
way to supply data and analyses and to monitor agencies’ com98
pliance with statutory mandates. And though confidence in
interest representation has waned in recent decades, participa99
tory mechanisms remain a cornerstone of administrative law.
91. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992).
92. See Croley, supra note 90, at 5.
93. See Kagan, supra note 83, at 2273; Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory
Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397,
418–20 (2007).
94. See Croley, supra note 90, at 5, 34 –41.
95. See Mendelson, supra note 93, at 419–20; see also Croley, supra note
90, at 142–62 (reviewing extent to which administrative processes accord with
various theories of regulation).
96. See Mendelson, supra note 93, at 418.
97. See id. at 419.
98. See Kagan, supra note 83, at 2360; Mendelson, supra note 93, at 419.
99. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans
Can’t Figure Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV.
(SPECIAL EDITION) 5, 6 (2009) (observing that “[f ]or agency governance to be
legitimate . . . administrative law must find ways to mediate [its] power,” and
that one critical mechanism for doing so in American administrative law is
through “fostering public participation in agency decision-making”); Wright &
Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1593 (“Current doctrines of administrative law carve out special zones of influence for expertise and for public input.”).
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B. HOW PARTICIPATION WORKS
1. Mechanisms of Participation
The paradigmatic example of administrative law’s requirement for public participation in agency policymaking is
the APA’s notice-and-comment procedure. In informal rulemaking, the APA requires an agency to provide the public with notice and an opportunity to comment before its proposed rule fi100
nally takes effect.
In practice, that applies whenever an
agency seeks to lay down legally binding substantive obligations at the wholesale level. The notice, which is published in
the Federal Register and on the federal government’s central
101
rulemaking website, must adequately frame the issues so as
to enable meaningful input by citizens: the agency must lay out
both the terms or substance of the proposed rule and its basis,
102
including its factual and scientific support. The comment period stays open for a specified amount of time, often a few
months. During that time, any interested members of the public may submit their own “written data, views, or arguments”
103
concerning the proposal. After considering the public’s comments and making any changes, the agency publishes its final
rule, again accompanied by a statement of its “basis and pur104
pose.”
The statement of basis and purpose must explain
“what major issues of policy were ventilated by the informal
105
proceedings and why the agency reacted to them as it did.”
The entire process, as the D.C. Circuit put it, is “designed (1) to
ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure to diverse public comment, (2) to ensure fairness to affected parties,
and (3) to give affected parties an opportunity to develop evi100.
101.
2012).
102.
shaus,

5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
http://www.regulations.gov (last visited Sept. 6,

REGULATIONS.GOV,

See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2006); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckel486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.4.6a (5th ed. 2008).
103. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); see, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1.13(h) (2012) (requiring minimum of sixty-day comment period after FTC presiding officer places a recommended decision in rulemaking record); 44 C.F.R. § 1.4(e) (2012) (FEMA policy
to allow public sixty days for comment submission); 50 C.F.R. § 424.16(c)(2)
(2012) (sixty-day comment period for proposed rules of the Fish and Wildlife
Service, Department of the Interior and National Marine Fisheries Service,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and Department of Commerce relating to listing of endangered and threatened species).
104. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
105. Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
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dence in the record to support their objections to the rule and
106
thereby enhance the quality of judicial review.”
Broad standing rules enhance public input. The APA allows any “person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved” within
the meaning of an agency’s organic statute to seek judicial re107
view of agency action. Courts interpret this language liberally to extend well beyond parties directly subject to an agency
108
rule.
They routinely allow trade groups, public interest
groups, and others having an interest in the subject of a rule to
109
challenge agency decisions. Challengers can contest the procedures used in promulgating the rule, by, for example, alleging
110
lack of notice of the basis for a proposed rule. They can attack
a rule’s substance, arguing, for instance, that it is arbitrary and
capricious because it contravenes the weight of scientific evi111
dence. Or they can raise hybrid procedural-substantive challenges, such as attacking a rule as arbitrary and capricious for
112
failing to respond to a major objection raised in comments.
Other general statutory provisions bolster participation as
well. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act encourages agencies to
work closely with affected stakeholders to reach consensus on
113
proposed rules before the agencies issue them. The Act permits an agency to convene a committee of interested persons
and organizations, some of whom the agency invites and others
who apply after public notice, to address a specific problem in
114
need of a rule. The committee then works with a facilitator,
who keeps a record of the proceedings, to reach consensus on
115
the substance of the rule. Successful negotiations result in a
proposed rule; unsuccessful negotiations at least result in some

106. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health
Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
108. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
154 (1970).
109. See id. at 155.
110. See United States v. N. S. Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir.
1977); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
111. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52–54 (1983).
112. See cases cited infra note 126.
113. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570a (2006); PIERCE
ET AL., supra note 102, § 6.4.6f, at 342–43 (describing negotiated rulemaking).
114. 5 U.S.C. § 564 (2006).
115. See id. § 566(d).
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116

pre-proposal airing of what the issues are. The Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Government in the Sunshine Act
similarly seek to ensure that meetings and consultations with
private interests on matters of agency policy are known and
117
open to the public.
Organic statutes and agency practices provide for similar
consultation in more specific contexts, such as long-range planning programs involving public land management and trans118
portation.
The Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, and other agencies
use risk-ranking, willingness-to-pay, and similar surveys to determine public preferences and values regarding harms to life,
119
health, or the environment. A number of agencies, such as
the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OHSA), also adopt public enforcement memoranda to guide
and explain their enforcement decisions, and they periodically
120
revise those policies in response to public concerns.
116. See generally NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK (David M.
Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds., 2d ed. 1995) (describing processes and
communications from a number of successful and unsuccessful negotiated
rulemakings).
117. See Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2 (2006); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006). The Freedom of Information Act also grants members of the public widespread access to agency information, enhancing citizens’ ability to make participation effective. See 5
U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
118. See, e.g., Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1612 (2006) (providing that the Secretary of Agriculture shall establish procedures to give the public adequate notice and an opportunity to comment on the formulation of standards, criteria, and guidelines applicable to
Forest Service programs).
119. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, VALUING THE PROTECTION OF ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS AND SERVICES: A REPORT OF THE EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY
BOARD 44 –45 (2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/
F3DB1F5C6EF90EE1852575C500589157/$File/EPA-SAB-9-012-unsigned.pdf (describing survey methods used in valuing ecosystem services); Baruch
Fischhoff, Ranking Risks, 6 RISK 191, 196–97 (1995) (describing EPA’s use of
state and local risk-ranking exercises to aid in priority determinations); see
also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1508 & n.115 (2001) (discussing the Health
Services Commission’s use of public quality-of-life ratings in determining priority condition-treatment lists).
120. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2011-1, 2011-1 C.B. 259, available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-01.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDANCE TO ICE ATTORNEYS REVIEWING THE CBP, USCIS, AND ICE CASES BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/guidance-to-iceattorneys-reviewing-cbp-uscis-ice-cases-before-eoir.pdf; OCCUPATIONAL SAFE-
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Like the APA’s notice-and-comment procedure itself, many
of these mechanisms apply primarily to agency actions taken at
the wholesale, or rulemaking, level—the equivalent of a sentencing commission’s creation of binding sentencing guidelines.
Individual sentencing determinations, by contrast, are more
like adjudications. But even at the retail level of individual
agency adjudications, public input is important, if less systematized. Some agencies, like the FCC, allow interested parties
121
wide latitude to intervene in formal adjudications. Others,
like the NLRB, let interested parties submit views and data via
122
amicus briefs.
Where civil penalties or consent decrees are at issue in
agency enforcement actions, some statutes and regulations re123
quire soliciting and considering public comments. A few, like
the Tunney Act, go even further. It requires the Department of
Justice to give public notice of civil consent judgments entered
under U.S. antitrust laws, provide a sixty-day comment period,
and publish both the comments and its own written response in
124
the Federal Register. The district court must find that the
consent judgment is in fact in the public interest before entering it and may consider the public’s comments in making that
125
determination.

TY AND HEALTH
MANUAL (FOM)

ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OSHA’S FIELD OPERATIONS
(2009), available at http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_
pdf/CPL_02-00-148.pdf. Many agencies adopt similar practices for a variety of
informal and non-binding guidance documents. See Mendelson, supra note 93,
at 424 –27; see also Memorandum from Rob Portman, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and
Budget, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 13–18 (Jan. 18,
2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m0707.pdf (requiring agencies to gather and accept public comments for “significant” guidance documents, but generally not requiring them to offer a public
response).
121. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.223 (2012).
122. See BRENT GARREN ET AL., HOW TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NLRB
207 (7th ed. 2000); see generally PIERCE ET AL., supra note 102, §§ 5.5–5.5.4, at
171–81 (surveying agency intervention rules).
123. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4) (2006); FTC Regulations, 16 C.F.R.
§§ 2.34(c)–(e) (2012); Consumer Product Safety Commission Regulations, 16
C.F.R. §§ 1118.20(e)–(g) (2012); see also Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(d) (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (2006);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (2012) (adopting procedures for
public comment on proposed consent judgments under CERCLA).
124. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)–(d) (2006).
125. See id. §§ 16(e), (f )(4) (2006).
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2. Participation, Explanation, and Judicial Review
Opportunities to participate would be worth little if agencies could ignore public comments at will, with no explanation
or oversight. Administrative law gives teeth to participation by
requiring robust explanations and judicial review. Agencies
conducting informal rulemakings, for example, must respond to
significant public comments on the record, particularly those
that criticize the agency’s position or provide new, pertinent in126
formation. In informal adjudications, statutes do not formally
require agencies to respond to comments. Even there, however,
agencies cannot act “arbitrar[ily] and capricious[ly]” or ignore
significant information or arguments provided by intervenors
127
or other commenters. In all cases, agencies must base their
decisions on the information before them and must adequately
explain their choices.
Courts take a “hard look” at agency action to enforce that
principle, probing the record and agencies’ reasoning to ensure
that their decisions are not arbitrary, have some basis in fact,
128
and comply with their organic statutes. That means that
agencies must justify refusals to embrace obvious alternatives,
such as the choice of one route over another in building a high129
way through a park. They must explain how they are treating
like cases alike and different cases differently, such as why one
refusal to bargain with a group of faculty at one university con130
stitutes an unfair labor practice while another does not. And
they must give reasons for changing course from past positions,
such as denying waivers of deportation to aliens who fraudulently enter the country after having allowed such waivers for
131
years. In short, in implementing their visions of the public in126. See, e.g., PPL Wallingford Energy LLC v. FERC, 419 F.3d 1194, 1198–
99 (D.C. Cir. 2005); La. Fed. Land Bank Ass’n, FLCA v. Farm Credit Admin.,
336 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
127. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
128. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 102, § 7.5, at 391–403 (describing the
hard-look doctrine).
129. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413–20; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 57 (1983) (“An agency’s view of what is in the public interest may
change, either with or without a change in circumstances. But an agency
changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis.” (quoting Greater Bos.
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
130. See Lemoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
131. See INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996).
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terest, agencies must explain and justify each exercise of their
discretion.
Public input and judicial review do not give either courts or
the public the final say. Agency decisions are still agency decisions. It is a time-honored principle of administrative law that,
in reviewing agency actions, courts will not substitute their
132
own vision of the public good for that of the agency. Judges
must give great deference to agency judgments, particularly
where they are “the product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the
statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested
133
facts.” Agencies have the primary role in shaping their substantive agenda, as exemplified by Chevron’s famous instruction that courts must defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of their organic statutes whenever Congress has not
134
“directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”
Public input into agency decision-making does not by itself
drive all of these requirements, and we do not mean to suggest
that it does. What it does do, however, is serve as a critical spur
for judicial review. It helps courts to prod agencies to defend
their actions as they “reweigh and reconcile . . . often nebulous
or conflicting policies . . . in the context of a particular factual
135
situation with a particular constellation of affected interests.”
By forcing agencies to defend their actions in light of competing
facts and values, participation helps courts to ensure that
136
agency action aims at some honest vision of the public good.
Thus, even though notice-and-comment procedures have
proven to be costly, courts and scholars criticize agency procedures that cut the public out of the process. Policymaking
through case-by-case adjudication is one example, particularly
where adjudications are ill-publicized and inaccessible. The
D.C. Circuit has criticized such an approach as “pure ad
132. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 102, § 7.5, at 391–97; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 42–43.
133. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947).
134. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842 (1984).
135. Stewart, supra note 79, at 1684.
136. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1043 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (“[P]ublic participation assures that the agency will have before it the
facts and information relevant to a particular administrative problem . . . [and] increase[s] the likelihood of administrative responsiveness to the
needs and concerns of those affected.” (alterations in original) (quoting Am.
Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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hocery” that is inconsistent with important participatory val137
ues. Agencies’ increasing use of informal guidance documents
to establish enforcement and regulatory priorities has sparked
similar concerns. Nina Mendelson has shown how the use of
guidance documents is especially likely to cut input by diffuse
138
regulatory beneficiaries out of the process. Courts have likewise criticized agencies for using guidance to make policy slowly without either public input or the opportunity for judicial re139
view. As if to underscore the point, the Supreme Court has
stressed that Chevron deference is presumptive where the
agency’s interpretation has been run through “a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster . . . fairness and
140
deliberation,” such as notice-and-comment rulemaking.
C. CRIMINAL LAW’S INSULARITY
Many of the same institutional conditions that drove support for public input into agency decision-making underlie criticisms of plea bargaining. Federal prosecutorial power expanded
rapidly throughout the twentieth century, particularly during
141
Prohibition, the New Deal, and the last four decades. As
criminal laws multiplied, so did prosecutors’ discretion to
charge and enforce. And as plea bargaining replaced trials as
the dominant mode of resolving cases, discretion to charge and
enforce quickly became discretion to sentence. That gave prosecutors enormous practical control over determining and imple142
menting criminal law policy.
137. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106,
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
461, 542 (2003) (describing the participatory shortcomings of policymaking by
adjudication); David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and
the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 306–07 (2010) (describing the
participatory benefits of policymaking by rulemaking).
138. See Mendelson, supra note 93, at 420; see also Franklin, supra note
137, at 305 (reviewing participation-based criticisms).
139. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
140. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–30 (2001); see also
Bressman, supra note 137, at 534 –45.
141. See Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 6, at 884 –85.
142. See Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 6, at
30–32, 30 n.1; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1998, at 8–9 (2001); Lynch, supra note
6, at 2123 (“The substantive evaluation of the evidence and assessment of the
defendant’s responsibility is not made in court at all, but within the executive
branch, in the office of the prosecutor.”).
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Yet the role of public input in binding governmental actors
to the public interest has received far less attention in criminal
than in administrative law. That is in part because of the lingering myths that juries still safeguard the public’s interest in
crime and punishment and that sentencing remains a predominantly judicial act. Most fundamentally, criminal law has been
slow to appreciate that prosecutors are now the “real lawmak143
ers” of criminal justice. It has thus failed to implement the
same structural and procedural safeguards upon which admin144
istrative law has long relied.
The depth and consequences of that failure are wellillustrated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, tasked with
formulating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Congress established the Commission as an “independent commission in
the judicial branch,” seeking to insulate it from political pressures and give the commissioners freedom to exercise their ex145
pert judgment on difficult issues of sentencing policy. But
Congress also exempted it from the most important procedures
designed to ensure honesty, transparency, and accountability
in federal rulemaking, including meaningful notice and com146
ment backed up by judicial review. Because courts could not
invalidate the Federal Guidelines as arbitrary and capricious,
the Commission did not have to explain its choices, build a factual record in support of its policies, or respond to public com147
ments with reasoned justifications. At the time, Congress
thought that the Commission would nevertheless adhere to
even more extensive procedures for seeking early comment,
“acquaint[ing] itself fully on the issues involved in the promul148
gation of specific guidelines.”
143. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 506 (2001).
144. See Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 6, at 1022–28.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006).
146. Specifically, the Commission was subject only to section 553 of the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(x) (2006). It was not subject to any of
the other requirements in chapter 5 of the APA, such as 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 554 –
59. Nor was it subject to the Freedom of Information or the Government in the
Sunshine Acts, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552b. Most significantly, it was not subject to
the judicial review provisions in chapter 7 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06.
147. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1631, 1643–44 (2012).
148. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 180–81 (1984); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(o), (p),
(x) (requiring notice and comment, consultation, and statements of reasons for
proposed Guidelines amendments). For an early assessment that proved to be
overly optimistic, see Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CALIF.
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The reality was far different. As Kate Stith and Amy Baron-Evans explain, facing no real constraints, “[t]he Commission
was therefore under no pressure to base its actions on reasons,
evidence, or a sound empirical foundation, and frequently acted
instead on the basis of political pressure or the Commissioners’
149
personal policy views.” It failed to take into account the views
of trial judges, the defense bar, or others who did not support
150
its proposals. It ignored suggestions and empirically grounded analyses from probation officers and others in the field, offering no justification apart from past practice for many sen151
tence levels.
It made key policy choices that were
unsupported by evidence, such as the decision to dismiss most
mitigating offender characteristics as irrelevant to the purposes
152
of sentencing. And, while nominally soliciting public input, it
promulgated amendments that differed from those proposed for
153
comment, leaving stakeholders no opportunity to respond.
The guidelines that resulted have long been criticized as unintelligible, complex, and unjust. The Commission’s approach
“significantly impaired the legitimacy of the Commission’s
rulemaking process” and undermined its credibility with the
154
public.
L. REV. 3, 7–16, 22–23 (1991).
149. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 147, at 1644; see also Samuel L.
Buffone, Control of Arbitrary Sentencing Guidelines: Is Administrative Law
the Answer?, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 137, 139 (1991) (Commission relied on “the
instincts or political judgment of the individual commissioners rather than a
sound empirical basis”).
150. See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 147, at 1643.
151. See id. at 1644 –45; Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1,
15–18 (1988); Joseph W. Luby, Reining in the “Junior Varsity Congress”: A
Call for Meaningful Judicial Review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 1199, 1202 (1999) (“The Commission . . . rarely justifies its
guidelines, consistently avoids on-the-record decisionmaking, and operates
unencumbered by the procedural safeguards that ensure the political legitimacy of other administrative agencies.”).
152. See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 147, at 1723–24; see also Breyer,
supra note 151, at 19–20.
153. See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 147, at 1643; Ronald F. Wright,
Amendments in the Route to Sentencing Reform, 13 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 58, 64
(1994) (noting lack of open meetings by Commission’s advisory committees and
conclusory nature of the Commission’s explanations for its final Guidelines,
without the supporting factual evidence or responses to important comments
typically offered by most rule-making agencies).
154. Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform:
Establishing a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV.
217, 229 (2005). The same problems infect some state guidelines. See BUREAU
OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
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The same problems of opacity and insularity infect prosecutorial charging and bargaining. Unlike sentencing commissions, prosecutors are not formally charged with formulating
sentencing policy as a matter of law. But they undoubtedly exercise their charging and bargaining authority to make such
policy in fact. When they do, they very often confront the same
sort of intractable tradeoffs that exist in other areas of regulatory policymaking. Many charging and bargaining decisions involve difficult value judgments about how to spend limited resources in light of a host of competing and incommensurable
155
factors. These include the need for retribution and deterrence, concerns for victims and communities, equality, patterns
of police enforcement, and the relative notoriety of some
156
crimes.
The public interest in plea bargaining, like the public interest in other administrative decisions, is a “texture of multiple strands” that “involves a balance of many interests” not al157
ways in harmony.
Prosecutors must “reweigh and
reconcile . . . often nebulous or conflicting policies . . . in the
context of a particular factual situation with a particular con158
stellation of affected interests.” And, in the absence of any objective guidepost of the public good, they should do so against
the background of the public’s information and values, explaining their decisions and justifying the tradeoffs involved.
III. CRAFTING A SYSTEM OF NOTICE-AND-COMMENT
SENTENCING
While the analogy is far from exact, criminal sentencing
STRUCTURED SENTENCING 36–37 tbl.4 -1 (1996), available at https://www
.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/strsent.pdf (compiling descriptions of state sentencing guideline commissions, not all of which include members of the public).
155. See, e.g., Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1439, 1446–63 (2004) (examining reasons for prosecutorial declination
decisions).
156. See id. See generally Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines:
Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190
(2005) (examining normative, resource-allocation, and other tradeoffs in the
design of state sentencing systems).
157. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 627 (1944) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 360 (1972).
158. Stewart, supra note 79, at 1684; see also Wright & Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1594 (“In the administration of crime policy, as in
other government activities, expertise has become essential, yet justice officials must also come to terms with public input.”).
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could learn a good deal from administrative law. Applying administrative law principles does not mean mirroring how agencies implement them, especially at the retail level of deciding
individual cases. The particular procedures that work for developing nationwide emissions standards are far too slow and
rigid for criminal adjudications. Nevertheless, administrative
law principles could inform the range of wholesale and retail
decisions that influence sentences downstream, including sentencing-guidelines, charging, plea bargaining, and possibly arrest decisions. Those principles support broad rights to participate, reasoned sentencing decisions, and appellate review.
These changes would check agents’ discretion and bolster the
legitimacy of sentencing, increasing transparency and accountability and fostering better outcomes.
A. WHOLESALE OR RETAIL?
Sentencing-related decisions occur at multiple levels. Individual officers decide whether to arrest; individual prosecutors
decide how to charge and plea bargain; and individual judges
decide how to sentence individual defendants. These are retail
decisions. Traditionally, most of the action was at the retail
level. But increasingly, retail decisions are powerfully shaped
by a variety of wholesale-level standards, including statutes,
guidelines, policies, and norms.
The pros and cons of wholesale versus retail decisionmaking, and rules versus case-by-case adjudication, are well
159
known. Rules promise greater consistency and allow broader
input from a wider range of people, which bolsters their legitimacy. As they provide advance notice, they can more easily
shape conduct ex ante. The downsides can include rigidity and
the difficulty of specifying and weighting the relevant criteria
160
in advance. Case-by-case decisions are more flexible, allowing
decision-makers to tailor sentences ex post. They can thus reflect the particular facts and factors at issue, especially atypical
or hard-to-codify circumstances. They can also more easily include the harms suffered, evidence, and possibly views of the
persons most affected by the decision. But case-by-case decisions risk being arbitrary or discriminatory, too slow and cost-

159. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991).
160. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO.
L.J. 1743, 1754 –56 (2005) (discussing definitional spillovers inherent in rules
and the impact they have on deterrence).
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161

ly, and too narrowly focused and shortsighted.
We propose a mixture of wholesale- and retail-level reforms. At a minimum, prosecutors’ offices, sentencing commissions, and probably police departments should apply noticeand-comment principles in adopting wholesale policies. They
should propose policies, solicit public comment on them, respond to important comments, and publish final policies with
162
reasoned justifications. As we discuss below, most of these
policies should be judicially reviewable at the wholesale level,
whether or not individual defendants or victims can challenge
their application. The policies could be framed with some gen163
erality, exceptions, and room to evolve. Even so, they would
furnish benchmarks and concrete guidance to police, prosecutors, judges, legislatures, and the public.
Readers convinced by our wholesale solutions could stop
there. Adopting policies would be most analogous to administrative notice-and-comment rulemaking, and the costs and delays would be easiest to bear at the wholesale level. But we
propose going further, to apply notice-and-comment-like principles to at least the most visible and serious cases at the retail
level. Temporally, retail notice and comment would occur at individual sentencing hearings. But at those hearings, judges
would review a host of upstream decisions that affect sentences, most notably the charges and plea bargains upon which
prosecutors agree. When prosecutors had declined to charge at
all, there would be no sentencing hearing at which to review
these decisions, so retail notice and comment would not apply
to individual declinations. When prosecutors had struck charge
164
bargains, however, judges would review those bargains. As
161. See id. at 1755–56.
162. See supra Section II.B (discussing basic notice-and-comment principles). An example of what we envision is the U.S. Department of Justice’s policy on selecting charges. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.300 (1997). The most recent version of that policy
instructs federal prosecutors ordinarily to charge and not drop the most serious readily provable offense. Id. But it goes on to identify factors that prosecutors may consider in assessing, case by case, how stringently to apply this policy when charging and plea bargaining. See id.
163. See Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 515, 601–02 (2000) (quoting Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation,
and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV.
925, 927 (1960)) (discussing how formally adopted policies can serve as “established starting points for reasoning, pointing the decision-maker in a specific
direction without mandating a particular result” or precluding flexibility when
circumstances dictate).
164. When prosecutors agreed to a deferred prosecution before filing a
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Part IV notes, costs and delays loom larger at the retail level,
and practical constraints limit the numbers and kinds of cases
covered. With those caveats, we suggest that both levels of decision-making could benefit from notice-and-comment-type processes.
The wholesale and retail levels would interact. Wholesale
policies would structure retail decisions ab initio, and patterns
of retail decisions could later prompt new policies or amendments in light of experience. Commenters on proposed wholesale rules could draw attention to patterns of retail cases, and
commenters in individual cases could point to the purposes and
limits of applicable rules. Pragmatism calls for allowing some
ex post input to clarify concepts, such as retribution, that rules
cannot precisely specify ahead of time. The reasoning justifying
decisions at each level could take account of the lessons learned
at the other level. Ideally, the combined system would be dy165
namic and evolutionary. It would learn gradually from the
collective wisdom embodied in patterns of individual decisions
while ironing out inconsistencies and outliers.
B. AT THE WHOLESALE LEVEL: ARRESTS, CHARGING, PLEA
BARGAINING, GUIDELINES, AND SENTENCING
Our goal is to improve the functioning and legitimacy of
the sentencing process. But criminal procedure is a stream, and
decisions upstream have profound consequences for the justice
that flows downstream. Police arrests, prosecutors’ charging
decisions, and sentencing guidelines structure plea bargaining,
which in turn channels discretion at sentencing. Conversely,
plea and sentencing hearings may allow judges to revisit upstream decisions before accepting pleas or imposing sentences.
Police traditionally enjoy broad latitude in whether to arrest or not, so long as they meet the low threshold of probable
166
cause. Likewise, prosecutors traditionally enjoy broad discretion in whether and how to charge, so judges have been hesi-

charge, there would be no hearing at which to review the decision. But judges
could review post-charge deferred prosecution decisions at hearings on whether to adjourn the charge in contemplation of dismissal.
165. See, e.g., David Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 7 n.16 (1992) (reviewing conceptions of legal decision-making as a dialogic
activity).
166. See, e.g., John Koerner, Between Healthy and Hartman: Probable
Cause in Retaliatory Arrest Cases, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 785–86 (2009) (discussing arrest discretion).
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167

tant to regulate prosecutorial charging.
Prosecutors, the
thinking goes, are in the best position to weigh enforcement
priorities and the need for general deterrence, and revealing
their enforcement policies could chill enforcement and under168
mine prosecutorial effectiveness. Like prosecutors, police labor under resource constraints, and they do not want to telegraph situations in which they will not arrest, lest they
encourage crimes below that threshold. Thus, courts abjure dictating which arrests and charges police and prosecutors should
pursue or bargain away.
Courts and other actors can, however, achieve the same
goal in less intrusive ways. For example, as Ronald Wright has
pointed out, judges, legislatures, or sentencing commissions
could prompt prosecutors to self-regulate by making them draft
169
their own charging guidelines. At plea and sentencing hearings, judges could then review prosecutors’ consistency or their
reasons for deviating from those guidelines. Wright points to
the example of New Jersey: The New Jersey Supreme Court
held that the imbalance of prosecutorial power over mandatory
minimum sentences, coupled with limits on judges’ traditional
sentencing discretion, would violate the state separation of
170
powers. The court required the state attorney general to draft
guidelines to instruct county prosecutors on when to seek en171
hanced sentences for repeat drug offenders.
The attorney
general complied, instructing trial attorneys on when to trigger
enhancements, how big plea discounts should be in ordinary
cases, and what aggravating or mitigating factors might justify
167. “[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978);
see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468, 470 (1996) (requiring a
high evidentiary threshold before a defendant can even obtain discovery to
help prove a claim of racially selective prosecution); Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“This broad discretion [to decide whether to prosecute] rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.”); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114,
123–24 (1979) (finding no constitutional problem in allowing prosecutors to
choose among overlapping charges with differing penalties, absent unconstitutional discrimination).
168. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
169. See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of
Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1027–42 (2005).
170. Id. at 1030–31 (citing State v. Lagares, 601 A.2d 698, 701–05 (N.J.
1992)).
171. See Lagares, 601 A.2d at 704.
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172

larger or smaller discounts. In each case, prosecutors had to
explain why they were or were not seeking the extended sen173
tences. Sentencing courts would then review prosecutors’ actions in light of the guidelines and stated reasons to determine
whether (as in administrative law) they had exercised their
174
discretion arbitrarily and capriciously.
Several years’ experience showed that local variations in
175
prosecutorial policies let troubling disparities remain. Thus,
six years after the initial guidelines, the state supreme court
directed the attorney general to issue new guidelines that al176
lowed less regional variation. The attorney general complied,
issuing prosecutorial guidelines that keyed plea offers to the
seriousness of the crime, the defendant’s criminal history, and
177
the timing of the plea. The attorney general tweaked the
guidelines over the next few years, and, after six years and consultation with judges, defense attorneys, and county prosecu178
tors, issued a major overhaul of the guidelines.
The New Jersey experience was not perfect. The guidelines
that resulted were still largely expert-driven, and, as with the
Federal Guidelines, members of the public were not integral to
179
the process. But it teaches that sentencing judges can review
upstream charging and plea-bargaining decisions downstream,
at sentencing, without usurping the prosecutorial role. Retaillevel cases can prompt wholesale-level charging and bargaining
policies that are refined over time in light of future retail cases
172. See Wright, supra note 169, at 1031 (citing N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB.
SAFETY, ATTORNEY GENERAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE NO. 1996-03 (1996)).
173. E.g., State v. Vasquez, 609 A.2d 29, 32 (N.J. 1992).
174. See Wright, supra note 169, at 1031 (citing State v. Leonardis, 375
A.2d 607, 618–19 (N.J. 1977)); see also Lagares, 601 A.2d at 704 –05; Vasquez,
609 A.2d at 32.
175. Wright, supra note 169, at 1031.
176. See id. at 1031–32 (citing State v. Brimage, 706 A.2d 1096, 1107 (N.J.
1998)).
177. See, e.g., N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, ATTORNEY GENERAL DIRECTIVE NO. 1998-1: PROSECUTING CASES UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE DRUG
REFORM ACT (1998), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/pdfs/agdir.pdf;
N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING CASES UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (1998), available at http://www
.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/pdfs/agguid.pdf.
178. Wright, supra note 169, at 1032–33; see also N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB.
SAFETY, BRIMAGE GUIDELINES 2 (2004 REVISIONS), available at http://www
.nj.gov/lps/dcj/agguide/brimage_all.pdf.
179. See Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain
in New Jersey, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1087, 1094 n.31 (2005) (discussing the
speed with which the New Jersey Attorney General promulgated the guidelines).
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and input from the bench and bar, creating a feedback loop.
Outside oversight and pushback helps to ensure that guidelines
do not remain hopelessly vague generalities but offer increasingly concrete guidance. And rather than drafting guidelines
themselves, judges can prod prosecutors to self-regulate their
upstream decisions. By prompting guidelines and reasons,
judges can elicit both better sentencing information in individual cases and more consistent exercises of discretion across
cases.
While the New Jersey example did not involve public input, courts could use these same tools to catalyze public input
into upstream decisions, encouraging police and prosecutors to
take a notice-and-comment approach to guidelines. Some prosecutors’ offices, such as that of Kitsap County, Washington, al181
ready do just that. Since 1995, the Kitsap County prosecutor’s office has published charging and plea-bargaining
guidelines intended to “answer[] . . . most . . . questions about
182
[its] approach to charging and disposing of criminal cases.”
The guidelines manual does so in detail, by, for example, rank183
ing enforcement priorities in descending order, differentiating
184
charging standards based on categories of crime, and spelling
185
out criteria for sentencing and diversion. But “its true value
186
comes from the way it was developed.” Volunteer citizens’
groups and representatives from local government, police agencies, the defense bar, and the community at large had direct input into the process. Their input challenged the office to define
187
its role and required it “to give straight answers.” When reviewing prosecutors’ actions downstream, courts could consider
how thoroughly applicable guidelines had been vetted, perhaps
deferring more where they resulted from a participatory, open,
188
accountable process.
180. See Michael M. O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
459, 484 (2009) (discussing feedback loops that could flow from meaningful
sentencing explanations on the record).
181. See RUSSELL D. HAUGE, OFFICE OF KITSAP CNTY. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, MISSION STATEMENT AND STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES 1 (2007),
available at http://www.kitsapgov.com/pros/StandardsGuidelines2007.pdf.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 4.
184. Id. at 6–9.
185. Id. at 10–15.
186. Id. at 1.
187. Id.
188. See infra text accompanying notes 263–269 (discussing appellate review); cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221, 227 (2001) (stating
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Another lesson from New Jersey is that not all charging
decisions are alike. People often lump all enforcement and
charging decisions together, but not all decisions fit the same
mold. Some charging and arrest decisions are classic decisions
not to pursue certain wrongdoers at all because of insufficient
189
evidence, limited resources, or similar factors. On the one
hand, these can be seen as classic enforcement decisions involving non-judicial issues of resource allocation, and their revelation might telegraph to prospective wrongdoers that crimes below certain thresholds will not be pursued at all. There is thus
some argument that such decisions touch core issues of discretion, entrusted to the executive and less suited to judicial re190
view or public involvement. On the other hand, decisions not
to arrest and not to charge can contribute to patterns of sentencing inequality and otherwise implicate the public’s concern
191
for justice. Particularly where proof problems are absent, declination can result from early, hidden plea bargaining, cloaking
prosecutors’ value judgments and substantive decisions about
whether and how to punish.
Thus, at the wholesale level, we tentatively favor requiring
advance notice, public deliberation, revisions based on input,
and reasoned justifications for declination and perhaps arrest
policies. Offices could also give notice that they were developing
entire groups of rules, such as plea-bargaining guidelines, and
192
solicit input in their large-scale development processes.
that deference to administrative authority may be shown by an agency’s power
to “engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking”).
189. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 125, 136 tbl.1 (2008) (laying out some of the most common reasons for declining to bring charges).
190. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court has recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to
prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision
generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion . . . . This recognition of
the existence of discretion is attributable in no small part to the general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement.”).
191. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial
Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 564 (1978) (“[T]he discretion of American prosecutors lends itself to inequalities and disparities of treatment because of disagreements concerning issues of sentencing policy . . . . It may also lead to a
general perception of unfairness, arbitrariness and uncertainty and may even
undercut the deterrent force of the criminal law.”).
192. At the federal level, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) does something similar with its annual Unified Regulatory Agenda,
which it publishes in the Federal Register. The Unified Regulatory Agenda
compiles the regulatory agendas from all federal entities that have regulations
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These notices could be posted on government websites and
criminal justice blogs, as well as in the traditional criminal justice periodicals, community newspapers, and government publications like the Federal Register (or state equivalents). As in
other areas of policymaking, the aim would be to better incorporate the facts, preferences, and values of the public into crafting prosecutorial polices. Prosecutors’ offices could even use
surveys to help rank the public’s values and concerns for certain categories of crimes, punishments, or enforcement criteria,
much as agencies’ willingness-to-pay surveys elicit the relative
193
values of lives, jobs, and the environment. Many organizations would have the incentives and expertise to contribute a
range of perspectives by commenting on the issues at stake.
Likely commenters include academics, public defenders, criminal-defense organizations, civil-liberties groups, victim advocates, police unions, prosecutor organizations, and bar authori194
ties.
Police and prosecutorial policies could be non-binding, or
binding and subject to exceptions. But they would still set
benchmarks against which the public could evaluate police and
prosecutors, much like the enforcement guidelines already used
195
by many agencies. As Erik Luna has proposed, community
input could, for example, guide police policies on using force
196
and limiting vice enforcement. Such input into declination
under development or review. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 642
(1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006); see also Exec. Order No.
13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2011); Christopher Demuth, OIRA at Thirty, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 15, 16 (2011) (discussing history of OIRA’s
approach to the annual agenda).
193. See supra text accompanying note 119.
194. See infra notes 297–299 and accompanying text.
195. See supra text accompanying note 120.
196. Luna, supra note 163, at 590–623. See also KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
POLICE DISCRETION 98–120 (1975), WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST 513 (1965),
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 423–28 (1974), and Gerald M. Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by
Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 500, 502 (1971), for
examples of other earlier and notable proposals to use rulemaking to guide
and constrain police practices. For examples of more modern takes on the issue, see Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551,
658–63 (1997) (discussing the role of guidelines in community and problemoriented policing), David Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1271–79 (2002) (discussing the evolution—or lack thereof—of police rulemaking in the Fourth Amendment context since Professor Amsterdam’s 1974 article), and David Sklansky Police and
Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (2005) (connecting evolving conceptions of
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and possibly arrest policies would guard against discriminatory
patterns of enforcement and increase public legitimacy. Kitsap
County, for one, already publishes its declination guidelines,
197
suggesting that fears of publicity are overblown.
Kitsap
County’s policy expressly differentiates between its willingness
to decline property and violent crimes, stating its willingness to
198
proceed with the latter based on weaker evidence. It stakes
out its potentially controversial position publicly, opening it to
scrutiny and debate.
Many charging issues are not really enforcement decisions
but sentencing decisions. Often, the government has investigated, arrested, and decided to prosecute the wrongdoer and
can prove his guilt any number of ways. At that point, the prosecutor files specific charges in order to promise or threaten a
specific sentence and thereby induce a plea. Charge-bargaining
decisions implicate classic sentencing considerations such as
199
equality, remorse, and the goals of punishment. When the
question is not whether to arrest and prosecute but how much
to punish, judges can more easily bring arbitrary-andcapricious review and similar administrative law tools to bear.
Sentencing is a judicial decision amenable to review. Both
wholesale and retail charging and plea-bargaining decisions
that amount to sentencing decisions could easily receive the
same treatment.
Reforms should address not only the sentencing pipeline
from police to prosecutor to judge, but also the guidelines
promulgated by sentencing commissions. The widely criticized
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines emerged from a secretive, insular
process that nominally involved public comment but in fact included no meaningful public deliberation, justifications, or judi200
cial review. The Federal Guidelines rarely evolve in light of
201
retail feedback. Yet federal courts still routinely defer to the
democracy to jurisprudential and academic approaches to policing).
197. See HAUGE, supra note 181, at 6–9.
198. Id. at 6–7.
199. See Mary Patrice Brown & Steven E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice:
Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1076–84 (2006) (discussing the role of such
considerations in both informal and formal plea bargaining).
200. See supra notes 148–154 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 56–57, 94 –95 (1998) (describing the Federal Guidelines as “simply a compilation of administrative diktats”
because “the Commission almost never explains the reason behind a particular Guidelines rule”).
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Commission without requiring the statements of reasons de202
manded of other agencies. The lesson of the Federal Guidelines is that a sentencing commission must do more than just
solicit public input and then disregard it. Sentencing commissions should instead take input seriously, deliberate over it, respond to substantial comments, offer clear reasoning, and face
judicial review of both wholesale guidelines and the retail sentences that apply them.
In marked contrast to the federal experience, many states
203
have succeeded by applying these lessons. Many states’ guidelines emerged from deliberative processes that included a vari204
ety of lawyers and laymen, such as victims and even convicts.
A more open commission is more likely to listen to and show respect for each voice, deliberate over the inevitable hard choices,
create buy-in, and adopt simple guidelines that turn on obvi205
ously relevant criteria. And transparent, reasoned guidelines
206
are better able to evolve. New criticisms and unexpected cases can challenge the expressed rationales for guidelines, leading sentencing commissions to refine or revisit their initial
207
rules in light of experience. At the retail level, individual sentencing judges can justify deviations based on factors that were
not adequately taken into account in formulating guidelines. In
Federal-Guideline-speak, those are cases that fall outside the
208
heartland of typical cases. An accumulation of such individu202. See id. at 57 (noting that “unlike the rules of other federal agencies,
the Sentencing Guidelines may not be challenged in court” for being arbitrary
or capricious); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy
Decisions After Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 717, 724 (2009) (observing that
existing approaches to appellate review of the Guidelines run “counter to ordinary principles of administrative law”); Stith & Dunn, supra note 154, at 229–
33 (discussing lack of judicial review of the Guidelines and the Sentencing
Commission’s reasoning).
203. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715,
758–87 (2005) (contrasting the failures of the insular U.S. Sentencing Commission with the successes of the more inclusive Minnesota, Washington, and
North Carolina commissions).
204. See id. at 771–87; see also Dale Parent, What Did the United States
Sentencing Commission Miss?, 101 YALE L.J. 1773, 1775–77 (1992) (discussing
Minnesota guidelines); Wright, supra note 153, at 63 (discussing Wisconsin,
Louisiana, Arkansas, Washington, Utah, and Minnesota guidelines).
205. See Parent, supra note 204, at 1777–78 (discussing Minnesota experience).
206. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357–58 (2007) (explaining how feedback, input, and reasoned responses from the Sentencing Commission enables the Guidelines to evolve).
207. See Stith & Dunn, supra note 154, at 228–29.
208. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1, ch. 1, pt. A, intro.
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al cases may signal that it is time to reexamine the general rule
in light of experience, perhaps because the atypical case may
209
have become typical. More problematically, the typical sentence may continue to generate such resistance that it suggests
the commission should reconsider its rule.
The Federal Guidelines were supposed to embody such an
evolutionary process, but the rigid, insular federal process has
210
not lived up to that promise. Yet there is no inherent reason
why it could not. Many federal agencies—including the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, the Mine Safety and Health Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration—have used
notice and comment to produce what are effectively sentencing
guidelines for their administrative penalty systems, periodical211
ly refining those guidelines in light of experience.
A final lesson of the New Jersey experience is that, as in
cmt. 4(b) (2006).
209. See Stith & Dunn, supra note 154, at 229–30; Rita, 551 U.S. at 357–58
(explaining how the reasoned sentencing judgments of individual judges contribute to the Guidelines’ evolution).
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), (C) (2006) (stating Sentencing Commission’s goals of promoting fairness and equal treatment while maintaining flexibility and reflecting advancements in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to criminal justice); O’Hear, supra note 180, at 484 (discussing “the
evolutionary process that guidelines development is intended to be”).
211. See U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (setting aside FCC civil penalty schedule for failure to conform to notice-andcomment procedures under the APA); Rules of Practice for FAA Civil Penalty
Actions, 55 Fed. Reg. 7980, 7980 (Mar. 6, 1990) (inviting public comment on
changes to rules of practice regarding FAA’s civil penalty authority); Civil
Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,882, 39,882 (July 3, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 19, 27) (requesting comments regarding the EPA’s proposed inflation adjustment to civil monetary penalties);
Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, 72 Fed.
Reg. 13,592 (Mar. 22, 2007) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 100) (promulgating
final rule of Mine Safety and Health Administration revising civil penalty assessment regulations and incorporating revisions suggested during notice-andcomment period); Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories, Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity, 73 Fed. Reg. 62,327, 62,337 (Oct. 20, 2008) (seeking
comment regarding OSHA’s administration of a Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity system for policing the safety of certain products in the workplace, including comments on the use of penalties to sanction “inaccurate or incomplete
information”); see also Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 853, 869, 872–73 (2012) (reviewing civil penalty guidelines of the Mine
Safety and Health Administration and FCC). Even when agencies do not use
the formal notice-and-comment procedure, they frequently publish detailed
but non-binding guidelines, which they periodically revise based on experience
and informal input from stakeholders. See supra note 120 and accompanying
text.
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administrative law, individual adjudications can be bound up
with generating, applying, and refining rules. Judges adjudicate concrete cases or controversies, but in doing so they consider proffered reasons and patterns of disparate enforcement
212
and outcomes. Sometimes those reasons and patterns are
rooted in formal or informal policies, but sometimes they
213
emerge from individual, case-by-case decisions. In either scenario, judges and the public can prod prosecutors to selfregulate, promulgating and explaining their rules while specifying exceptions and leaving some wiggle room. As prosecutors
apply these guidelines to offer reasons for individual sentences,
judges and members of the public can ensure consistency and
214
prompt further refinements and revisions. The process is iterative and collaborative, with room for feedback and incremental improvements. It respects prosecutors’ superior
knowledge and resource constraints but calls on them to weigh
these factors and justify workable policies. And it demonstrates
how individual adjudications can go hand in hand with ongoing
systemic reform.
The more general point here is that, to be meaningful, input and review must come in time. If judges at plea colloquies
accept charge or sentence bargains that effectively dictate particular sentences, sentencing becomes a charade. The timesensitivity of input and review argues in favor of having judges
defer acceptance of charge bargains and stipulated sentences
until sentencing, where they can more pointedly question both
the wholesale policies and retail considerations driving proposed punishments. Courts already have this power, but deferring acceptance could be required, or at least become the
212. Cf. Lemoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(observing that the need for an agency to explain itself and distinguish analogous cases is “particularly acute” when the agency makes policy through caseby-case adjudication, because it ensures predictability, intelligibility, and
equal treatment).
213. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947) (discussing agencies’ ability to establish policies through general rules or “the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards”); White, supra note 53, at 449–53 (same, in context of plea bargaining).
214. See Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 175, 180–82 (2005) (discussing how reason-giving and appellate review
can function as a feedback tool in sentencing, engaging courts in an extended
conversation between sentencing commissions and legislatures); Wright &
Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1611 (“As the topics addressed
in general guidelines multiply, questions can arise about the basis for the policy choices built into the guidelines.”).
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215

norm.
Time-sensitivity also argues in favor of allowing citizens to
challenge finally adopted, binding, wholesale policies at the
time of their promulgation, as is common in administrative
law. Because of the breadth of public interest in criminal justice, any citizen of the jurisdiction should be able to bring such
216
a challenge. The process would function much as it does in
any garden-variety challenge to a final agency rule. After the
sentencing commission, prosecutor’s office, or other policymaking body issued a final rule, the reviewing court would apply
some variant of hard-look review, examining the record and the
explanation accompanying the rule to ensure that the policymaker had responded to significant comments, considered the
relevant evidence and data, explored reasonable alternatives,
217
and otherwise not acted arbitrarily or capriciously. As courts
reviewing administrative agency policies have occasionally
done, reviewing courts also could relax threshold ripeness and
finality requirements to allow significant but technically nonbinding guidance documents to be immediately challenged at
the promulgation stage, particularly where it is clear that the
guidance effectively establishes on-the-ground policy in the
218
mine-run of cases.
C. AT THE RETAIL LEVEL
Something analogous to notice and comment could also operate at the retail level of at least some individual sentencings.
The formality of procedure that accompanies true notice and
comment of the administrative law sort would be far too cumbersome if simply transferred over to retail sentencing hearings. But the concepts and principles that underlie notice and
comment—advance notice, inclusion of a range of views, and
215. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (authorizing courts to accept, reject, or defer decisions on charge or stipulated-sentence bargains until after
the court reviews the presentence report).
216. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (allowing any “person . . . adversely affected
or aggrieved” within the meaning of an agency’s organic statute to seek judicial review of agency action).
217. See supra notes 128–131 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 380–81 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020–23 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir.
1998); McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320–21 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); see also Mendelson, supra note 93, at 438–44 (describing possible
approaches to and standards for judicial review of significant guidance documents at the promulgation stage).
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meaningful consideration of those views by the decision-maker,
against a backstop of judicial review—could inform retail participation. These concepts would apply loosely and with less
formality than in full-blown rulemaking, but still subject to
sentencing’s procedural safeguards. This section sketches how
such an approach might look.
1. Who and How: Advance Notice
We see at least two possible models for initiating noticeand-comment sentencing at the retail level. One would allow
prosecutors to set the agenda in major cases, as they do now.
The prosecutor would publish a notice, in writing and on the
Internet, setting forth the basic facts, charges, and benchmark
guideline sentences for similar offenders and offenses and proposing a particular plea-bargained sentence. For a set period of
time, members of the public, victims, defendants, and their
families could submit written or recorded comments. These
could include both facts and opinions bearing on the appropriate sentence. The defendant and perhaps the victim could see
and respond to the various comments, as could the probation
officer who prepares the presentence report. They might also be
able to testify in open court. A judge would make the final sentencing determination, taking into account the prosecutor’s explanation, all comments, and responses to those comments. The
judge would defer where appropriate but still probe the substance and the reasoning of the recommendation.
This approach would continue our tradition of leaving
prosecutors in charge. It would not be a radical change in that
sense, but it also would do less to fix the excesses of prosecutorial power. For example, prosecutors’ initial sentence recommendations would serve as powerful mental anchors that frame
219
the terms of debate going forward. Empirical evidence shows
that judges defer heavily to prosecutors’ discretionary recom220
mendations.
219. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 119–28 (2011)
(describing the anchoring effect, which causes a decision-maker to rank options based on one piece of information and then adjust upward or downward,
giving the initial anchor inordinate influence on the final outcome); RICHARD
H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 23–24 (2008) (describing the same
effect).
220. See, e.g., Ebbe B. Ebbesen & Vladimir J. Konecni, Decision Making
and Information Integration in the Courts: The Setting of Bail, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 805, 820 (1975) (finding that while in hypothetical
cases judges relied most heavily on a defendant’s local ties in setting bail, in
actual cases prosecutors’ recommendations were the single most important
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The other possible structure would give probation officers
the power to set the terms of debate. They would issue notices
of proposed sentencing listing the facts, charges, and guidelines
calculations specifying a range of sentences, very much like the
presentence investigation reports that probation officers al221
ready routinely prepare for federal sentencing. (This would
be harder to accomplish in overburdened state courts, where
funds are tight and presentence investigations are much less
thorough than in federal cases.) Prosecutors, defendants, victims, and the public would react and submit their own comments and proposals. As discussed below, the final decision
222
would lie in the hands of a judge. At least the most important
cases might also involve advisory sentencing juries, reflecting
the public’s shared sense of justice. Judges would render ultimate decisions and issue public, reasoned opinions. The goal is
to come up with a blend of judicial expertise and public input
that reflects and balances systemic needs, individualized considerations, and popular concerns.
2. What: The Range of Facts, Factors, and Views
There is a range of ways to implement notice and comment
at sentencing. We envision a ladder of types of retail input,
which readers may climb as high as they like. Even skeptical
readers should join us on the first rung of the ladder, acknowledging the importance of factual input bearing on the seriousness of the crime and the blameworthiness of the wrongdoer.
The second rung involves soliciting broader factual information
relevant, for example, to various justifications for punishment
or broad concerns about enforcement or sentencing patterns.
That could include the seriousness of the crime problem in the
community, the harms suffered by this victim, and how possible punishments would affect third parties such as the defendant’s family and neighborhood residents. A third rung would
seek assessments of the factors and values relevant to a particular sentence, such as the particular defendant’s blameworthiness and factors not taken into account by statutes or sentencing guidelines. The final, most controversial rung would solicit
a range of views on the appropriate outcome. On any of these
rungs, as in administrative law, commenters would enjoy no
determinant of judges’ bail decisions).
221. See NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 496–
504 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing preparation of presentence investigation reports).
222. See infra notes 248–256 and accompanying text.
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223

The courts would ultimately find
decision-making power.
facts, apply the law, weigh the relevant factors, and impose
sentence.
At the first rung, a small group of people—defendants’ families, doctors, employers, teachers, and neighbors—can offer
factual information about the individual wrongdoer. Often,
there are extenuating circumstances ranging from mental
handicaps to good character and prospects for a law-abiding
224
life. Good defense lawyers and probation officers already ad225
duce some of this information. But currently, prosecutors and
sentencing judges need not explicitly respond to it, and soliciting input more broadly and systematically might paint more
complete pictures. This modest effort to systematize what already happens haphazardly should not be controversial.
At the second rung, a somewhat larger group can offer
broader factual information relevant to sentencing. Victims and
their families can explain the direct and indirect harms that
they have suffered from this crime or whether the defendant
226
has tried to make amends. Residents of the neighborhood can
likewise illuminate the harms and fears they have suffered
227
from similar recent crimes. Commenters can also cast light
228
on a variety of remedial and third-party interests. They could
talk about the costs and benefits of incarcerating this wrongdoer. Even if a wrongdoer deserves punishment, for example, barring him from his profession or depriving his family of its
breadwinner may not prevent future danger or might harm in229
nocent third parties. Neighborhood residents can discuss the
benefits of prison, restitution, drug treatment, and other alter223. See supra notes 127–135 and accompanying text (explaining that
while agencies must take public input seriously, decision-making power remains with the agencies).
224. See, e.g., Scott Atlas, How Can We Be Sure?, 29 LITIGATION 1, 1–2
(2003) (reviewing types of mitigating evidence at sentencing).
225. See Denny Chin, Sentencing: A Role for Empathy, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1561, 1567 (2012) (describing typical submissions from the parties and interested persons before sentencing); Tess Lopez, Make the Sentencing Process
Work for You, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 59–60 (describing items defense
counsel should prepare during the presentence process).
226. See Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as
Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282, 299–305 (2003) (discussing victim participation at sentencing).
227. See generally Katie Long, Note, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim’s Right or Victim’s Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 187, 195 (1995).
228. See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 1383 (2002).
229. See id. at 1390.
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native sanctions and remedies, and can reflect on what the
wrongdoer would have to do to redeem himself in the communi230
ty. This factual information is highly relevant not only to
harm-based understandings of retribution, but also to the need
for deterrence, expressive condemnation, mercy, and forgiveness.
In addition to facts about the crime, at the third rung,
members of the community can offer a range of perspectives on
relevant policies and values in the context of the particular
case. For example, they can debate the wrongfulness of this
particular crime, the blameworthiness of this wrongdoer, the
need to deter and incapacitate him, and the like. The array of
perspectives can only help to inform the sentencer’s ultimate
balancing of the aims of punishment. They can also reflect upon
how global, macro-level considerations about enforcement,
charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing apply to this case.
They could discuss equality, adducing statistics about the sentences awarded to similar defendants and any alleged racial or
231
socioeconomic disparities. They could reflect on the costs of
depriving this community of its young men. They could likewise
criticize the racial impact of enforcement and charging decisions made earlier in the process, such as enforcement efforts
232
targeting this neighborhood. They could criticize the dishonesty of a charge bargain or an equivocal guilty plea and question the award of a massive discount for a cooperating witness.
And they could shed light on the public message that various
sentences here would send to potential wrongdoers and victims.
Some readers might even be comfortable with a final rung,
allowing commenters to voice their views on the appropriate
sentence. Prosecutors and defense lawyers already offer such
views. Victims, community members, and public interest
groups could serve as counterweights, offering and justifying
their own proposed sentences. Expressing these views might
prove cathartic, venting steam and giving commenters their
233
day in court. But it would also offer judges a range of opinions upon which to reflect. Sentencing judges would remain
free to accept or reject these suggestions, but these views could
230. See id. at 1390–92.
231. See id. at 1401–02.
232. See generally David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285,
296–97 (2001).
233. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse
and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 88–89 (2004).
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prompt them to consider diverse approaches and explain the
reasoning supporting their sentences.
However high up the ladder one goes, we do not suggest
letting sentencers in individual cases use comments as a basis
for disregarding wholesale value judgments embodied in appli234
cable guidelines or policies. Comments on appropriate sentences would carry influence only within the guideline sentencing range, except when they highlighted unusual factors not
considered by the guidelines that made those cases atypical.
Patterns of comments reflecting sustained criticism of guidelines might, however, eventually lead to reforming the wholesale rules. Ideally, retail comments would form part of a larger
feedback loop.
The comment period would remain open for a set time—
say, thirty or sixty days. Comments could be submitted orally
in open court (at least by the immediate parties), in writing, or
over the Internet. Some commenters might request that their
names or their comments not be published beyond the immediate parties and sentencers, particularly when they discuss sensitive personal information. With those exceptions and redactions, most comments could be made available over the
Internet, allowing other commenters to reflect on and take issue with one another’s assertions. On some blogs, threads of
comments degenerate into name-calling, but well-managed
threads (perhaps moderated by a probation officer) could highlight areas of consensus and disagreement. E-rulemaking proponents such as Cynthia Farina have already been grappling
with how practically to use websites, social media, and other
new technologies to manage and aggregate public comments,
235
and their insights and findings could be brought to bear here.
234. At least, that is, where the guidelines or policies were the product of
open, participatory, and reasoned processes. Where they resulted from closed,
insular, and opaque processes that failed to address significant input, evidence, and criticism, some deviations, whether in response to comments or
not, might be appropriate. Cf. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101–
02 (2007) (authorizing district courts to disregard the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ 100-to-1 crack-to-powder cocaine ratio for sentencing).
235. See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV.
395, 412–16, 432–40 (2011) [hereinafter Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0] (discussing strategies for facilitating effective online commentary, including the
use of both trained moderators and systemic design components to stratify and
manage information and comments); Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in
140 Characters or Less: Social Networking and Public Participation in Rulemaking, 31 PACE L. REV. 382, 393–416 (2011) [hereinafter Farina et al., 140
Characters or Less] (describing case studies involving a pilot Rulemaking 2.0
project, Regulation Room, that uses web technologies, including Facebook,
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Before and at sentencing hearings, the parties could read
and respond to comments raising significant evidentiary or factual issues, using live rebuttal witnesses, documentary evidence, and reasoned arguments. They might even be able to
236
subpoena, cross-examine, and impeach adverse witnesses.
There would thus be multiple checks on the accuracy and representativeness of commenters’ views: other commenters could
disagree, the parties would have notice and opportunities to respond, and sentencers would have the final say. That input
would enjoy more procedural safeguards than the bare hearsay
that currently fills many probation officers’ presentence re237
ports.
Allowing such input would inform judges in giving concrete
meaning to abstract justifications for punishment. In administrative law, governing statutes often set forth vague standards
238
such as public “safety” or the “public interest.” The same is
true of sentencing provisions in criminal law. In federal law, for
example, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) directs sentencing courts to
consider retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilita239
tion. These concepts, however, are abstract and elastic, and
they take shape through practical reasoning and application to
concrete cases. Popular judgments of blameworthiness and just
deserts, in particular, are quite subtle and influenced by the
specific circumstances of individual wrongdoers as well as
Twitter, and others, to inform stakeholders of proposed rulemakings and facilitate their participation and comments).
236. Many jurisdictions already provide some version of this process for resolving disputed issues of fact relating to sentencing. See ARTHUR W.
CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 10:4 (3d ed. 2004); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.4(g) (5th ed. 2009). In the Second Circuit, for
instance, such hearings are known as Fatico hearings. See United States v.
Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053, 1057 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979).
237. See, e.g., Gary M. Maveal, Federal Presentence Reports: Multi-Tasking
at Sentencing, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 544, 574–76 (1995).
238. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(1)(B) (2006) (providing that applications
for use of new drugs shall be denied if the drug is found to be “unsafe”); 47
U.S.C. § 307(a) (2006) (“The [Federal Communications] Commission, if public
convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby . . . shall grant to any
applicant therefore a station license provided for by this chapter.”).
239. Section 3553(a)(2) provides, “[t]he court, in determining the particular
sentence to be imposed, shall consider . . . the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).
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240

crimes. Public input in a concrete case can reflect the many
facets of just deserts, helping judges to give desert appropriate
241
weight.
Popular involvement also can legitimate the more eclectic,
less philosophically pure approach to punishment that exists in
real-world criminal justice. In an eclectic approach, just deserts
may be central but tempered by a variety of other considerations such as incapacitation, deterrence, moral reform, restitu242
tion, and apologies. Theorists may abhor such a hash, but the
public, prosecutors, and policymakers care about a fairly wide
range of factors. Yet it is surprisingly difficult to specify in the
abstract how much weight each factor deserves, and that
243
weight may vary from case to case. A more robust feedback
mechanism for considering these factors in real cases helps to
check discretion and promote the accountability and legitimacy
on which criminal justice depends in a democracy. A hybrid
system can allow both probation officers and the public, both
judges and juries to have their say, blending expertise with
popular voice. That range of voices is more likely to lead judges
toward a consensus middle ground, moderating the idiosyncra240. See Paul H. Robinson, Some Doubts About Argument by Hypothetical,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 819–23 (2000). See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON &
JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995) (comparing lay views with substantive criminal
code provisions on a variety of criminal law issues).
241. The Supreme Court’s jury sentencing cases reflect just this notion. See
Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 994 –
1002 (2003); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519–20 (1968) (explaining capital jury’s sentencing role as “express[ing] the conscience of the
community” and “speak[ing] for the community”).
242. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Psychology of Punishment, 11 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 171, 175–76 (2004) (noting that retribution, rather than consequentialist goals, is central to popular punishment judgments); see also Darley, supra note 1, at 661–76 (noting empirical evidence of public’s central focus
on retribution but willingness to consider incapacitation in at least some cases); Paul H. Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good-Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737
(2012) (confirming that substantial numbers of respondents are willing to
modify sentences significantly based on factors such as remorse, apology, forgiveness, and restitution).
243. See Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 1745, 1770–72 (2012) (discussing difficulty of specifying appropriate
weighting of sentencing factors ex ante through general rules); see also CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 43 (1996) (“Any
simple, general, and monistic or single-valued theory of a large area of the
law . . . is likely to be too crude to fit with our best understandings of the multiple values that are at stake in that area.”).
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244

sies of a given prosecutor or judge. The result should be a
more well-rounded, inclusive process that reflects upon all the
245
relevant factors.
The broad range of factors requires an equally broad scope
for comment and input. Collectively, the array of comments
would amount to a detailed record supporting the sentencing
decision, permitting more thorough appellate review. Retail
sentencing decisions by jurors or judges, unlike popular initiatives and referenda, rest on detailed facts that can trump gen246
eralized fears and stereotypes. They may thus be inoculated
247
against “the pathological politics of criminal law.”
3. To Whom: The Identity and Job of the Sentencer
As suggested above, one could allocate the ultimate power
to sentence in several different ways. One way is the status
quo, which leaves sentencing to a single judge. The advantage
of judicial sentencing is the judge’s expertise and insulation
from immediate political pressure. But those very advantages
can be seen as disadvantages, as non-lawyers distrust judges’
representativeness and attentiveness to popular moral judg248
ment.
Another approach, used by only a handful of states, is to
249
vest power in a sentencing jury. That would add a further
244. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 243, at 35–54; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1545 (1988) (discussing how injection
of public perspectives and information into agency policymaking helps to determine the public’s “preferences about preferences”). See Bierschbach &
Stein, supra note 160, for a similar argument in the context of systemic rules
for determining criminal liability and punishment.
245. See Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and
the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 124 –27 (2001) (arguing that
rules adopted through the use of negotiated rulemaking have greater legitimacy and public acceptance); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 73 (2000) (discussing how popular
participation informs the course of deliberation in a deliberative democracy,
“combin[ing] popular responsiveness with a high degree of reflection and exchange among people with competing views”).
246. See Robinson, supra note 240, at 819–23.
247. The phrase, though not the particular conception of pathology we are
discussing, is of course from the title of William J. Stuntz’s The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 143 (initial capital letters lowercased).
248. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future
Generations: A Proposal for a “Republican” Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
444, 469–70 (1996) (discussing ways in which federal judges “are frequently
overly insulated from popular values”).
249. Six states retain jury sentencing in non-capital cases. See Nancy J.
King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State
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measure of democratic legitimacy to sentences, ensuring that
250
they track popular moral judgments. But, like sentencing by
popular poll, unfettered jury decision-making raises fears of
mob rule by ignorant amateurs.
A compromise, hybrid approach would somehow blend sentencing judges and juries. One could have juries make recom251
mendations but vest final power in judges. One could give
sentencing power to juries subject to judicial comment, remit252
titur, or other review. Or one could have hybrid lay-expert
panels, much as German panels comprise professional and lay
253
judges.
The choice along this spectrum depends on how one balances expertise and democracy. Academics tend to favor expertise and distrust popular input as mob rule; hence, scholars are
254
often hostile to juries. Voters, on the other hand, may distrust judges and experts and see criminal justice as a matter
for lay intuition and moral desert. Administrative law offers a
framework for reconciling these perspectives. Courts defer to
experts so long as they follow public, transparent procedures
255
that solicit a range of input. That requires the experts to take
public input into account and to justify their decisions with onthe-record reasons. And, within the executive branch, expert
bureaucrats remain accountable to elected superiors, who can
reverse or moderate their policies. Expertise and democracy
may sometimes be in tension, but they can coexist and accom256
modate each other’s perspectives.
Leaving final authority with sentencing judges would be
Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 886 (2004).
250. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J.
951, 992–95 (2003); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice,
89 VA. L. REV. 311, 350–53 (2003).
251. See Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 749 (2010)
(discussing differences between plea and petit juries); Bibas & Bierschbach,
supra note 233, at 141–44 (discussing plea and sentencing juries).
252. See Hoffman, supra note 250, at 1008–09 (discussing use of judicial
review as a safeguard against excessive jury sentences); Iontcheva, supra note
250, at 373–76 (same).
253. See Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Principles of German Criminal Procedure in Comparison with American Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 239, 243 (1970).
254. See, e.g., BIBAS, supra note 22, at 121–22 (lamenting this phenomenon).
255. See supra Subsection II.B.2.
256. See Wright & Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1594 (“In
the administration of crime policy, as in other government activities, expertise
has become essential, yet justice officials must also come to terms with public
input.”).

2012]

NOTICE-AND-COMMENT SENTENCING

57

less radical, and we favor that approach. The critical point is
that whoever the sentencers are, they must digest and reflect
upon the comments submitted. Having to respond to comments
and justify sentences publicly would not only discipline
257
sentencers, but also legitimate their decisions. So, for example, sentencers would have to justify why they treated seemingly like cases unalike, distinguishing the current case from the
258
typical case meriting the median guideline sentence. They
would have to explain why they chose not to use obvious alternatives such as civil remedies, non-prosecution agreements,
probation, drug treatment, and other less-costly alternatives to
259
prison. (In theory, federal judges are supposed to explain why
their proposed sentences are “sufficient, but not greater than
260
necessary, to” serve the various goals of punishment. But,
unchallenged by third parties and able to impose guideline sentences with scant explanation, courts feel little pressure to apply this principle of parsimony.) And, as in administrative law,
261
sentencers would have to respond to other major comments.
Sentencers would not have to devote equal time to every comment, but they would have to heed clusters of comments, recurring themes, and individual comments offering significant in262
formation or argument. They would issue public reasoned
decisions, which both justified the sentence and announced
precedents that could develop sentencing law and guide future
cases. These evolving lines of precedent would articulate and
weigh the competing values at sentencing.
As in administrative law, the emphasis on reasoned decisions situated within a fuller public record would enhance ap263
pellate review. To check defendants’ tendencies to collude
with prosecutors and waive their appeals even when it is not in
their interest, it might be necessary to allow sua sponte review
or enable probation officers or others close to a case to challenge sentences. A broader appellate process could even allow
aggrieved stakeholders to challenge sentences, checking possi257. See supra notes 126–131 and accompanying text.
258. See LeMoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
259. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 34, 46–51 (1983).
260. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
261. See Conn. Light & Power, Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
262. See id.
263. See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health
Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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ble abuses. That would include not only victims but also defendants’ families, public defender groups, sentencing think
264
tanks, and community members. One could establish thresholds for intervention on appeal or loosen rules of standing to let
265
these actors challenge final sentences on direct appeal.
Again, appellate courts could use a sort of hard-look review
to reverse sentences that were arbitrary and capricious in light
of the entire record. Factors that might trigger concern include
a thin evidentiary record; a perfunctory or generic explanation;
an extremely harsh or lenient sentence compared to similar
cases; and a failure to consider obvious alternatives, particular266
ly when imposing a novel sentence.
The reviewing court
would consider the entire process and reasons given, probing to
ensure a reasoned connection between the facts, arguments,
and policies (whether laid out in guidelines or developed ad
hoc) below and the final sentencing determination. It would
not, however, substitute its own value judgments or punish267
ment policy. Where the explanation or record support was deficient, the court would vacate the sentence and remand for re268
consideration.
Careful appellate review of this sort could
police sentences for fairness, consistency, and discrimination
while still allowing sentencers to develop sentencing policy to
269
reflect local values and concerns.
The goal here is not to create a welter of substantive rights
that could breed complexity and endless collateral litigation.
That is a legitimate concern but a manageable one. The aim is
simply to create procedural avenues that give stakeholders
voice and help to channel and influence exercises of discretion.
One can hope that, in the longer term, the lessons learned from
public comment and responses would create feedback loops. In
the end, these reforms might help judges, juries, parties, and
264. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (allowing any “person . . . adversely affected
or aggrieved” within the meaning of an agency’s organic statute to seek judicial review of agency action); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org. Inc., v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (liberally interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 702’s “adversely affected or aggrieved” language).
265. See supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text.
266. See Chanenson, supra note 214, at 178–82; Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentences: Reconsidering Deference, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2123, 2163 (2010).
267. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983).
268. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
269. See id.
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commenters to appreciate one another’s perspectives even if
they respectfully disagree.
D. AN EXAMPLE: THE PROBLEM OF COOPERATION
This notice-and-comment framework could ameliorate
some of the most contentious issues within criminal justice.
Take, for example, the problem of witnesses who cooperate with
the prosecution. Cooperating witnesses can earn large sentence
discounts for assisting police with undercover investigations
(by, for example, recording conversations and passing along in270
formation) or for testifying against their former accomplices.
The practice, however, is quite controversial. On the one hand,
criminal organizations are often hierarchical. So, for instance,
only low-level couriers and street-corner dealers can be caught
red-handed smuggling or selling drugs. A code of silence and
fear prevails, making low-level dealers unwilling to rat out
their bosses and so insulating the high-level wrongdoers from
prosecution. The same is true of other organized-crime syndicates and gangs. Cooperation rewards help police and prosecutors to flip the small fry to incriminate the middlemen and
271
work up the chain to catch the big fish.
The threat of stiff penalties, coupled with the lure of large
cooperation discounts, allows prosecutors to crack organizations and make cases that they could not otherwise have
272
made. Ringleaders, the most culpable wrongdoers, no longer
enjoy impunity but face their just deserts. That not only promotes retribution and expressive condemnation, but also increases deterrence by making detection and conviction more
273
likely. And it sows fear within organizations about potential
cooperators, potentially raising the cost of running a criminal
270. See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 20–22 (2003).
271. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307,
1328–29 (2003).
272. Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of
Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 292, 294 (1996)
(“Sentencing discounts to cooperators may thus be the only way to get critical
testimony in a large class of cases worth prosecuting.”); see also Ronald S. Safer & Matthew C. Crowl, Substantial Assistance Departures: Valuable Tool or
Dangerous Weapon?, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 41, 42, 44 (1999) (offering example
in which the threat of mandatory federal drug sentences, coupled with the
prospect of cooperation discounts, outweighed gang members’ fears about the
risks of cooperating).
273. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
903, 920–24 (2010); Richman, supra note 272, at 293.
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274

conspiracy.
Cooperation discounts, however, have their dark side. They
encourage snitching and disloyalty even to friends and family,
275
about which our society is deeply ambivalent. They endanger
horizontal equity, treating similarly culpable defendants differ276
ently. They threaten vertical equity, if more-culpable defendants have more information to trade and succeed in trading it
277
for lower sentences. They may undercut general deterrence,
encouraging conspirators to think they can cop pleas and get off
278
easily. Prosecutors may overbuy testimony and offer overly
generous discounts out of risk aversion, investigative laziness,
279
or a desire to undercut excessive sentences. Because prosecutors’ consent is a prerequisite to federal cooperation discounts,
there may be little oversight or explanation to check these deci280
sions. Cooperation discounts also risk encouraging perjury
281
from overeager cooperators. And they risk putting a premium
274. See Katyal, supra note 271, at 1334, 1340–43; Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 398–400 (2003). But cf. Baer, supra
note 273, at 925–26 (noting some circumstances in which cooperation benefits
may encourage socially deleterious behavior such as more price competition
among fragmented narcotics cartels and more threats of violence to maintain
group cohesion).
275. See Richman, supra note 272, at 293; see also Interview: Clarence Aaron, FRONTLINE: SNITCH, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
snitch/cases/aaron.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012) (recounting example of a
defendant convicted based on cooperation by his friends and cousin); Interview:
Joey Settembrino, FRONTLINE: SNITCH, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/snitch/cases/joey.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012) (recounting example of
a defendant convicted based on cooperation by his friend).
276. See Richman, supra note 272, at 292.
277. See id. But see Linda Drazga Maxfield & John H. Kramer, Substantial
Assistance: An Empirical Yardstick Gauging Equity in Current Federal Policy
and Practice, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 6, 11 (1998) (finding that data did not support perception that more-culpable conspirators were more likely to receive
discounts).
278. See Baer, supra note 273, at 907, 944; Richman, supra note 272, at
293.
279. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Defending Substantial Assistance: An Old
Prosecutor ’s Meditation on Singleton, Sealed Case, and the Maxfield-Kramer
Report, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 45, 48–49 (1999); Richman, supra note 272, at
292–94.
280. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006) (requiring prosecutorial substantialassistance motion as prerequisite for imposing sentencing below statutory
mandatory minimum); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2011)
(authorizing judges to offer substantial-assistance discounts upon motion of
the prosecutor).
281. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 952
(1999).
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on defense counsel’s experience, connections, and willingness to
282
cooperate.
Scholars often view cooperation discounts as binary, a
choice between trusting prosecutors and trusting judges to ra283
tion appropriate discounts. But a range of inputs at both the
wholesale and retail levels could illuminate the range of competing values at stake. Notice and comment could chill prosecutorial overbuying and excesses of pressure to cooperate. (Recall,
for instance, the public criticism of Kenneth Starr for pressuring Monica Lewinsky to cooperate by subpoenaing her mother
284
to testify before a grand jury. ) Public commentary could also
call attention to suspected perjury and to discounts that
threaten vertical and horizontal sentencing equity.
In responding to comments, prosecutors and others would
help to build records explaining and justifying their sentences.
Prosecutors and sentencing commissions would both adopt
wholesale policies to structure the cooperation process and jus285
tify retail sentencing recommendations in individual cases.
At both levels, they would explain when there are no alternatives to cooperation; how cooperators are chosen; and why specified discounts are reasonable and proportional to the amount
of assistance given. They would also demonstrate why, on balance, discounts in certain circumstances increase overall deterrence by removing ringleaders’ impunity. And they would help
to justify prosecutorial priorities, explaining why the costs of
cooperation are worth it for certain types of cases and flagging
or fleshing out guidelines for cooperation in the process. If
properly justified, these sentences would seem more equitable,
commensurate with the assistance given, the risks taken, and
the remorse manifested by cooperators.
This process would improve particular sentences, but it
would also help to create a positive feedback loop. Knowing
that they would be held publicly accountable at the end of the
282. See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2485–86.
283. See, e.g., Richman, supra note 272, at 294 (framing this choice as a dichotomy and favoring prosecutorial power because prosecutors are better
placed to discern deception).
284. See, e.g., Ian Fisher, Testing of a President: The Mother; Mother ’s Legal Vulnerability is Seen as Motive for Lewinsky, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998, at
A16.
285. At least some prosecutors’ offices, such as U.S. Attorneys’ offices, already have such policies, although they are formulated behind closed doors
and not made public. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion,
Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 105, 125–30 (1994).
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process, police and prosecutors would be more careful about
their investigative, charging, and plea-bargaining decisions
earlier on. They would exhaust alternative investigative techniques before resorting to cooperation. They would take more
care to sign up the least culpable cooperators, compensating for
the natural tendency to favor defendants who have familiar,
286
well-connected defense lawyers. And they would better ration
their use of cooperating witnesses, reducing the systemic costs
of sentencing inequity and perceived unfairness. Opening sentencing to an array of viewpoints would not only increase
transparency and reasoned justifications, but in the long run
would also improve this shadowy corner of criminal justice.
IV. OBJECTIONS
We recognize that our participatory sentencing framework
brings with it its own set of concerns. One obvious objection is
that it is unnecessary: one might think that elections of local
prosecutors already provide a much more direct way of cabining
discretion, injecting public input into prosecutorial policymaking, and ensuring legitimacy and accountability to boot. Ronald
Wright, however, has shown that elections deliver far less than
287
they promise. Re-election rates are greater than 95%, with
288
about 85% of sitting district attorneys running unopposed.
Even those who face challengers “do not face much meaningful
289
public scrutiny of their policies or priorities.” Instead, Wright
shows, “elections turn on generic claims about ‘competence,’
familiar but unhelpful measures (‘conviction rate’), and—most
common of all—claims about high profile cases (both successes
and failures). Election rhetoric does not highlight ideological or
290
policy differences.” And even if it did, elections do not elicit
the same granularity of input on specific policies or the same
291
diversity of viewpoints from affected communities. As Erik
Luna explains, some of the groups most affected by real-world
sentencing policies—such as poor, urban, inner-city communities—have no real voice at the ballot box, leaving them with no
286. See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2485–86.
287. Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 581 (2009).
288. See id. at 592–93 (stating re-election statistics).
289. Wright & Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1606.
290. Id. (summarizing findings and conclusions in Wright, How Prosecutor
Elections Fail Us, supra note 287).
291. See Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 359, 389–90 (2005).
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effective remedy to or input into policymaking at the electoral
292
level. Notice and comment could bypass some of these pathologies, encouraging prosecutors to pay more attention to a wider
array of voices and information brought to bear on particular
293
policies or decisions.
Of course, for notice and comment to deliver on that promise, those voices must in fact materialize. A related concern
thus has to do with who participates. After all, one way of framing the problem with American criminal justice today is that
we have too much public participation, not too little. The broad
and deep codes that give prosecutors their power are the result
of a lopsided politics in which the “voices in favor of broader
laws and longer punishments are powerful” and those opposed
294
are weak. Critics might worry that a similar dynamic will infect the process we propose. They might fear that victims’
rights groups, prison guard unions, and other organized toughon-crime interests would dominate the comment process, fur295
ther skewing sentences toward even harsher punishments.
Interest representation in administrative law has in fact been
296
criticized on just these grounds.
But by formalizing and regularizing the voices that go into
sentencing, notice and comment likely would yield more balanced interest representation on sentencing issues than currently exists. The lesson of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
was not that tough-on-crime interests always drown out all
others. It was that, for interest representation to work in sen292. See Luna, supra note 163, at 589.
293. See id. at 587–90; Stewart, supra note 79, at 1775–76; Sunstein, supra
note 245, at 105–06.
294. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 6, at 1030; see also Stuntz,
supra note 143, at 546–52.
295. See Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 6, at 912 (noting that
“the problem with making prosecutorial decisions more transparent is that the
politics of crime might push them in a decidedly antidefendant direction”);
Wright, supra note 169, at 1013; see also Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of
Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 52–58 (2010); Erik Luna, The
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 720 n.82 (2005) (noting that California’s prison guard union “poured money into the campaign for
the anti-recidivist statute”).
296. See Croley, supra note 90, at 58–60; Kagan, supra note 83, at 2266
(noting criticisms that the efforts made to ensure broad interest representation in administrative law “had left in place, or perhaps even aggravated, substantial disparities in interest group influence”); Stewart, supra note 79, at
1670; see also William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J.
1351, 1356 (1997) (criticizing negotiated rulemaking on the ground that it “establish[es] privately bargained interests as the source of putative public law”).
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tencing, procedural mechanisms must exist to make participation meaningful. Most organized interest groups probably
would participate in formulating wholesale policies, as well as
in high-profile cases or those raising wholesale-level policy is297
sues.
Where they do, public defender groups, sentencingreform organizations, and other pro-defendant groups would
have the incentives and ability to participate along with every298
one else, as they sought to do with the Federal Guidelines.
The experiences of some state guidelines commissions, as well
as those of localities like Kitsap County, show that open, inclusive processes can be far more balanced than legislatures or the
299
Federal Sentencing Commission. Notice and comment could
thus help force on-the-ground sentencing policymakers to take
seriously voices that get little traction at the legislative level.
The dynamic would be similar in more run-of-the-mill cases, in which victims, defendants’ friends and families, and others often already submit information or arguments in a variety
300
of ways. A comment period would flush these views into the
open and put them on equal footing. True, in any given case
some risk will always exist that one side’s comments might
overwhelm the others. But sheer volume matters less than substance in the comment process. Moreover, the judge as
sentencer would retain the authority to disregard hysterical,
hateful, or other comments, as agencies disregard irrelevant or
301
extreme comments in rulemakings. As we have argued elsewhere, victims and individual citizens are far less vengeful
than we usually assume. They care not only about substantive
outcomes, but also about being listened to and taken seriously.
Particularly if they have their day in court, they will not auto302
matically demand the maximum punishment. And in all cases, prosecutors and judges would consider comments against
background sentencing principles that aim to ferret out bias,
297. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY:
THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 173 (2003) (discussing interest-group participation in high-profile criminal law policy issues); Wright &
Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1594 (discussing public input
into local criminal justice policy debates).
298. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 147, at 1643.
299. Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State
Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 443–44 (2000).
300. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
301. See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
302. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 233, at 137–39; see also BIBAS,
supra note 21, at 36–40, 91.
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inequality, and the like. By flushing into the open the policy
tradeoffs that drive prosecutorial charging, bargaining, and
sentencing decisions, notice and comment may guard against
303
such concerns.
Making prosecutorial policies more open and accessible
carries its own risks. Some readers might worry that disclosure
of guidelines or decisional criteria will undermine deterrence by
bridging the criminal law’s acoustic separation and sending
304
signals that some crimes are freebies. That worry is overblown, for several reasons. First, disclosure of prosecutorial policies does not mean the creation of binding enforcement or
charging thresholds. Prosecutors always could exercise their
reasoned discretion to pursue a given case as they see fit, and
some low-level arrest and declination decisions would still implicate resource-allocation issues largely off limits to comment
and review. Second, the limited evidence is that even jurisdictions that have disclosed declination and charging policies have
305
not seen an increase in low-level crimes. That may be in part
because deterrence is at least as much normative as it is coer306
cive, and in part because for those repeat offenders who are
most likely to offend again, disclosure only confirms what they
307
already know. Third, to the extent that deterrence is coercive,
it is the certainty and not the severity of punishment that mat308
ters most. For more serious cases in which the only issue is
303. See Mendelson, supra note 93, at 441 (arguing that a right to petition
for notice and comment for regulatory guidances could “prompt agencies to
identify more significant and controversial policies earlier, as well as to use a
more thorough, participatory process for these policies”).
304. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 669 (1984); see also Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 655, 686 (2006) (“Ordinarily, enforcement strategies are closely
guarded secrets, since disclosure undermines their efficacy and deterrence
value.”); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA.
L. REV. 407, 452 (2008).
305. See Wright & Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1615–17
(discussing Kitsap County). For examples of published prosecutorial policies,
see Richard H. Kuh, Plea Bargaining: Guidelines for the Manhattan District
Attorney’s Office, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 48 (1975) and Mario Merola, Modern Prosecutorial Techniques, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 232, 237–40, 251–58 (1980) (publishing some details of Bronx County District Attorney’s Office’s internal screening and plea-bargaining procedures).
306. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 591, 603–04 (1996).
307. See O’Hear, supra note 304, at 452.
308. See Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON.
INQUIRY 297, 307–08 (1991); Ann Dryden White, Estimating the Economic
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what and not whether to charge, the impact of disclosure on
law enforcement goals will thus be less of an issue. Finally, given the low risks of apprehension and offenders’ over-optimism
about their own risk of getting caught, deterrence is speculative
even without more disclosure. If disclosure teaches offenders
anything new, the benefits might equal or outweigh the costs
by bolstering the message that certain serious crimes are at the
309
top of prosecutors’ lists.
Finally, there are issues of cost and feasibility. Notice-andcomment sentencing will take time and money, and the volume
of cases to which it could potentially apply is huge. While these
concerns are real, they are also manageable. While we believe
many lessons can be learned from administrative law’s approach to participation, we do not recommend all of its cumbersome statutory and judicial strictures. Reforms need not happen all at once, and courts, legislators, and prosecutors’ offices
should experiment with what works best. At the wholesale level, the most formal procedures—those most closely akin to true
notice and comment in the administrative agency context—
might be reserved for statewide sentencing commissions, guidelines from state attorneys general, and other significant bod310
ies. Counties and local governments might start out by adopting less formal approaches bearing more resemblance to
negotiated rulemaking, such as town meetings or transparent
working groups comprising representatives of various inter311
ests. In retail cases, notice and comment could be restricted
Model of Crime with Individual Data, 94 Q.J. ECON. 57, 79 (1980).
309. O’Hear, supra note 304, at 452.
310. Cf. Memorandum from Rob Portman, supra note 120, at 15–18 (discussing when both traditional notice-and-comment procedures and less formal
alternatives might be appropriate for “significant” agency guidance documents).
311. As administrative law scholars recognize, negotiated rulemaking and
other informal processes tend to work best for rules that affect a relatively
small number of interests or manageable communities. Formal notice and
comment, by contrast, is better suited for rules that have significant effects on
many interests across a broad political community. See, e.g., PIERCE ET AL.,
supra note 102, § 6.4.6f; see also Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The
Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255,
1318–19 (1997) (noting in an empirical study of negotiated rulemaking that
“the EPA recommends formal negotiation only when the parties are ‘reasonably few in number,’” and that “the EPA rules that affect the broadest number
of organizations have never been selected for negotiated rulemaking” (citation
omitted)); Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1, 30, 46 (1982) (arguing that negotiated rulemaking “can reduce the time
and cost of developing regulations,” but that “negotiation would not work”
where “even several individuals could not represent the interests” of all of the
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to the most serious and heinous crimes, such as death-penalty
cases, terrorism cases, or widespread financial frauds. Or laws
could pick out contentious categories of cases, such as domestic
abuse, drunk driving, or victimless crimes, to throw competing
viewpoints into sharp relief. Alternatively, notice and comment
could be limited to cases raising significant issues that bear on
the public’s interest in the administration of criminal justice,
312
such as the use of informants. Judges could be given the authority to order notice and comment in individual cases they
find to meet that standard. Or the parties, probation officers, or
even members of the public could be allowed to petition for notice and comment under the same criteria, with rules prohibiting pro forma or abusive petitions and judges having the final
313
say. Drawing these lines will not be easy, but neither will it
be impossible.
Similar issues will need to be worked out as to how best to
notify members of the public and encourage the submission of
comments by a representative cross-section of the community,
especially at the retail level. One possibility would be to post
“Notices of Proposed Sentencing” on courthouse websites, with
314
links to critical record information and a comment form. This
likely would go some distance toward fostering involvement by
well-organized interest groups and those with easy Internet access. But its usefulness for drawing in more dispersed or less
industrial or other sectors affected by a rule); Keith Werhan, Delegalizing
Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 437 n.109 (arguing that “for negotiated rulemaking to be effective, the number of affected interests must be
relatively small (less than 20–25) and the interests of the parties should be
those that they are willing to trade off and compromise”). In small jurisdictions in which on-the-ground policymakers are already plugged into local concerns from a cross-section of the community—think, for instance, of a rural
jurisdiction in which the local prosecutor, judge, police, defense attorney, and
townsfolk generally know one another—much of what we propose might already be occurring informally one way or another, making the case for reform
less pressing.
312. Cf. Mendelson, supra note 93, at 444 –45 (discussing feasibility of
providing notice and comment for “significant” regulatory guidances).
313. Cf. id. at 439–44 (discussing feasibility of allowing citizens to petition
for notice and comment for regulatory guidances when certain criteria are satisfied).
314. See, e.g., Farina et al., 140 Characters or Less, supra note 235, at 390–
91 (describing one approach for translating a traditional Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to a digestible set of “Issue Posts” for use in soliciting comments
on the Internet); Peter M. Shane, Empowering the Collaborative Citizen in the
Administrative State: A Case Study of the Federal Communications Commission, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 483, 498–500 (2011) (reviewing Internet-based tools
for broadening the range of public input in FCC rulemakings).
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advantaged members of the public is less clear, particularly in
garden-variety retail cases in which public interest groups are
315
unlikely to be effective stand-ins. Perhaps probation officers
could collect brief comment sheets in advance as part of their
presentence investigations. They could also do more to reach
indirect victims, neighbors, and families of defendants, as well
as neighborhood watch groups, churches, parent-teacher asso316
ciations, and the like. Or perhaps standing, advisory sentencing juries could be empaneled, much like grand juries currently
sit, to help elicit factual information and inject more views into
317
the process. Admittedly, the further into retail sentencing our
proposal goes, and the further up the rungs of the retail ladder
one climbs, the more difficult the questions become. But the
fact that there are not easy answers here should not obscure
the point that there are questions worth asking. Without taking seriously the public’s voice in the public interest, we cannot
318
even begin the conversation.
CONCLUSION
Criminal and administrative law both grapple with how to
315. See Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, supra note 235, at 396–414 (describing results of two case studies that used a combination of traditional and
Internet-based approaches to attempt to increase outreach to and participation of stakeholders in rulemaking, and reporting mixed success).
316. Here too, the use of social media, including social networking sites like
Facebook, and other Internet-based strategies, might expedite such outreach,
although more research still needs to be done on how effectively to use such
tools. See generally id. (surveying current issues in agency rulemaking context). For recent examples of the burgeoning literature on this subject, see
Cliff Lampe et al., Motivations to Participate in Online Communities, PROC.
28TH INT’L CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 1927 (2010), available
at http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1753616, and Jennifer Preece & Ben
Shneiderman, The Reader-To-Leader Framework: Motivating TechnologyMediated Social Participation, 1 AIS TRANSACTIONS ON HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 13 (2009), available at http://aisel.aisnet.org/thci/vol1/iss1/5/.
317. See, e.g., Iontcheva, supra note 250, at 373–76 (2003) (discussing different models of judge-jury interaction at sentencing); see also United States v.
Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 219, 226–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing potential
use of advisory juries by courts).
318. Readers generally skeptical of the value of participation in administrative law will be skeptical of our proposals as well. Whether participation
has any place in administrative law generally is a much larger question that
we do not take on here. Our point is more limited: rightly or wrongly, administrative law is premised on the virtues of participation as a response to some of
the pathologies of the administrative state. Those same pathologies infect
criminal sentencing. It is thus worth thinking seriously about how that same
framework maps onto criminal justice, and onto real-world sentencing in particular.
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justify, channel, and legitimize professionals’ exercise of state
power. Yet the two fields have developed in almost complete
isolation from each other. Administrative law procedures elicit
the public’s information and value preferences, helping to blend
public input and expertise in giving meaning to vague terms
such as the public interest. Notice-and-comment procedures
thus constrain agency discretion and promote better outcomes.
But they also legitimize agency actions taken publicly after
heeding the public’s voices. While experts remain in charge,
they must reflect upon public input and justify their exercises
of discretion.
Criminal procedure could likewise benefit from explicitly
blending expert and lay perspectives. That does not mean importing all the slowness and rigidity of administrative rulemaking. Nor does it mean relying primarily on external controls
such as judicial review. But it does suggest that internal policies, checked by judicial review and public oversight, could do
much more to incorporate public input and promote clear, consistent justice. Although considerations of cost and volume
must limit the extent of retail reforms, criminal justice need
not remain a lawless anomaly. Few substantive standards
guide the decisions by which prosecutors and others shape
charges and sentences. We can do more to check professionals’
faithfulness in exercising discretion.
One could extend this Article’s ideas to other domains of
criminal justice, especially at the back end. One possibility is to
apply notice and comment to parole. To the public, parole risks
seeming like haphazard leniency that undercuts deserved punishment. Existing parole guidelines are flawed because they
were created without public notice or comment, so they do little
319
to justify parole or respond to legitimate public concerns.
Public, transparent, and participatory parole guidelines,
pegged to dangerousness, rehabilitation, illness, old age, and
the like, could both improve decisions and better explain them
319. See, e.g., NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW & POLICY
821 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that “usually . . . [parole] guidelines have been issued
by the parole board itself,” with little legislative or other oversight); ASS’N OF
PAROLING AUTHS. INT’L, PAROLE BOARD SURVEY 2003, at 7 (2004), available at
http://www.apaintl.org/documents/surveys/2003.pdf (finding in a survey of fifty-two parole boards, including those of forty-four states and several territories, that more than half did not use any formal set of written guidelines or
assessment instruments in making release decisions); Giovanna Shay, Ad Law
Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329 app. at 376 (2009) (detailing exemptions from state notice-and-comment laws for rules related to prisoners
and prison conditions, including rules governing parole).
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320

to the public. Likewise, executive clemency seems like arbitrary favoritism for well-connected convicts, or else gubernato321
rial softness on crime. Thus, pardons and sentence commuta322
tions have all but died out in many states.
Clemency
guidelines could structure consideration of remorse, apology,
reform, and prospects for a law-abiding life. In both instances,
public input at the wholesale level could help in working
through messy and difficult normative questions—what sorts of
release risks are worth taking, for what types of offenders do
the costs of continued imprisonment overwhelm the benefits,
what factors should matter most for the community’s for320. The factors governing parole release decisions are broad and varied.
They include things like the offender’s participation in prison programs; infractions of prison rules; job opportunities upon release; family ties; the seriousness of the original offense; expressions of remorse and repentance; the
risk of recidivism; and the views of victims, community members, prosecutors,
or sentencing judges. See, e.g., PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 170032, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE
PRISONS 4 –14 (1999), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=
pbdetail&iid=820 (describing how state boards approach parole decisions and
listing factors that shape those decisions); see also Miller v. N.Y. State Div. of
Parole, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (App. Div. 2010) (noting the parole board’s consideration of “the petitioner’s institutional record, including his disciplinary
record, program accomplishments, academic achievements, and post-release
living arrangements, as well as the violent circumstances of his crime, his
criminal history, and his continued claim of innocence” in making its release
decision (citations omitted)). Today, as a practical matter, dangerousness and
other public safety factors top the list. See Joshua Stengel, Parole’s Function,
Purpose, and Role in the Criminal Justice System, NAT’L INST. CORRECTIONS
(Aug. 30, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://community.nicic.gov/blogs/parole/archive/
2010/08/30/parole-s-function-purpose-and-role-in-the-criminal-justicesystem.aspx (describing how risk assessment and public safety concerns have
begun to dominate release decisions).
321. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State
and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1345–51 (2008) (connecting
declines in clemency and pardon rates both to concerns about unreviewable,
arbitrary, and capricious exercises of executive discretion and to tough-oncrime politics).
322. See Presidential Clemency Actions by Administration: 1945 to Present,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/actions_administration
.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2011) (documenting steady decrease in presidential
grants of clemency petitions from 36% under President Nixon to 1.8% under
President George W. Bush); Eric R. Johnson, Doe v. Nelson: The Wrongful Assumption of Gubernatorial Plenary Authority over the Pardoning Process, 50
S.D. L. REV. 156, 179 (2005) (observing that “[a] similar downward trend” to
the one at the federal level “can be found at the state level”); Daniel T. Kobil,
Should Mercy Have a Place in Clemency Decisions?, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY,
AND CLEMENCY 36, 37 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007) (citing a
survey of commutations from 1995 to 2003 that found that “most states averaged fewer than one hundred commutations per state, with thirty-four states .
. . having dispensed twenty or fewer”).
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giveness, and so forth. Retail-level input, say by parole or
even clemency juries in the most important cases, could provide
further political cover for risk-averse governors to grant mercy
324
in the right cases.
Practical challenges remain. Criminal justice agencies, like
other agencies, must experiment with identifying and including
representative samples of the public and managing issues of
cost and confidentiality. They must foster thoughtful dialogue
between expert and lay voices, modulating knee-jerk assumptions and responses. But these practical challenges should not
halt reform. Ultimately, we must strive to make criminal justice transparent and participatory enough to serve the public
interest and to earn the public’s confidence.

323. As David Ball notes, these and similar questions raised by parole are
especially amendable to some form of public input, which could help “determine whether releasing an individual would be ‘worth it,’ with all the vague,
value- and policy-laden implications that phrase entails.” W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 395, 408 (2011). The
same holds true for clemency, at least insofar as it should serve the public’s
and not the executive’s purely private or political interests. Whether an executive’s application of clemency guidelines should be subject to any sort of explanation or judicial review requirements is a separate question. For an argument that they should not be, see Barkow, supra note 321, at 1358–65.
324. Cf. Ball, supra note 323, at 407–10 (proposing an increased role for
juries in parole decision-making as a way of injecting community values into
parole release decisions); Douglas A. Berman, A Truly (and Peculiarly) American “Revolution in Punishment Theory,” 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1113, 1120 (2010–
2011) (discussing how parole juries could bring laypersons’ sense of justice to
parole release decisions).

